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VEBAS TO THE RESCUE: EVALUATING
ONE ALTERNATIVE FOR PUBLIC SECTOR
RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS
SUSAN E. CANCELOSI*
INTRODUCTION

Accounting rules have long enabled public sector employers to
maintain an ostrich approach to retiree health plan commitments
even as their private counterparts reduced or terminated similar
benefits. Over the past few years, however, a new accounting
standard has forced government plan sponsors to face their
accumulating liability and has pushed them to seek solutions. The
problems facing the public sector are not new. In fact, the
circumstances they face today bear striking similarities to the
situation in which many large, traditional manufacturing
companies found themselves in the early 1990s. The private
sector's retiree health crisis of almost two decades ago led to a new
variation on an old trust concept: a version of voluntary employees'
beneficiary association--or 'VEBA"--now known as a "defeasance"
or "stand-alone" VEBA. Although widely publicized1 in recent
years because of its embrace by the Detroit automakers 2 and the

* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School;
B.A./B.B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., Cornell Law School; LL.M.,
Health Law, University of Houston Law Center. An earlier version of this
Article was selected for inclusion in the 2008 Health Law Scholars' Workshop
sponsored by St. Louis University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the invaluable input and advice of all the readers who
participated in that Workshop, in particular David Pratt, Elizabeth Pendo,
Matt Bodie, Sidney Watson, and Tim McBride. The author also thanks Wayne
Law students Deborah Fischel (J.D. Candidate, 2011) and Christina
Ventimiglia (J.D., 2009) for their excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Nick Bunkley & Mary M. Chapman, Off the Picket Line at
G.M., Relieved but Wary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at C1 ('"Under the
tentative contract, health care liabilities will be shifted from G.M.[sic] to the
union as part of a new trust known as a voluntary employee benefit
association, or VEBA."); Sholnn Freeman & Frank Ahrens, GM, Union Agree
on Contract to End Strike; Deal Seen as Model Across Industries, WASH. POST,
Sept. 27, 2007, at Al ("Under the new contract, UAW retiree benefits will be
paid out by a voluntary employees' beneficiary association (VEBA).").
2. References to the "Detroit automakers" or to the "Detroit Big Three"
should be interpreted to mean Chrysler Group LLC ("Chrysler"), Ford Motor
Company ("Ford"), and General Motors Corp. ("GM") as these companies
existed before the 2009 bankruptcy filings and subsequent restructuring of
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UAW, 3 the stand-alone VEBA model has not been considered
seriously as an option for the public sector, but it should be. The
challenges that government employers face today closely parallel
those confronting certain private sector employers since the early
1990s. In light of the parallels, the defeasance VEBA structure
deserves discussion in the public sector.
Employers began promising retiree health benefits around
the middle of the last century. In the early decades of retiree
health insurance, employers apparently perceived retiree health
benefit costs as negligible. Because no accounting requirements
forced recognition of future costs, both private and public
employers made generous, open-ended promises. Not until an
accounting rule change in the early 1990s--Financial Accounting
Standards Board Statement of Financial Accounting No. 106
("FAS 106") 4-- required current balance sheet recognition of retiree
health benefit commitments did private sector employers grasp
the enormity of their past grants. A similar accounting rule
change in the final phases of implementation for government
employers--Government Accounting Standards Board Statement
No. 45 ("GASB 45") 5-- has generated a comparable shock wave in
the public sector.
When private sector employers realized the impact of FAS
106 on their balance sheets, many chose to terminate retiree
health benefits. Others imposed a variety of cost-containment
measures. Collectively bargained employers, however, generally
could not take such steps. Constrained by their agreements with
unions, they had little flexibility in managing their retiree health
expenses. Large, traditional manufacturing companies-with high
concentrations of unionized retirees and historically generous
benefit packages, but shrinking active workforces and negative
economic forecasts-found themselves struggling to remain
financially viable in the face of overwhelming liabilities.
The public sector today faces similar problems. Because
GASB 45 demands that government employers acknowledge the
true level of retiree health offers, they risk balance sheet disasters.
both Chrysler and GM.
3. The '"JAW" is the

commonly used acronym for the International Union,

United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America. See About the UAW, Who We Are, http://www.uaw.org/about/
uawmembership.cfm (last visited July 8, 2009).
4. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD ("FASB"), STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 106, EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR
POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS (1990) [hereinafter FAS

106].
5. GOV'T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD ("GASB"), STATEMENT No. 45,
ACCOUNTING
AND
FINANCIAL
REPORTING
BY
EMPLOYERS
FOR
POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS (2004) [hereinafter

GASB 45].
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Most have financed retiree health benefits on a pay-as-you-go
basis, with no assets set aside for future expenses. Many are
heavily unionized, with little room to shift costs to retirees, much
less to terminate benefits. Some have constitutional or statutory
guarantees that protect benefit commitments. Although they do
not risk liquidation the way private sector employers do, financial
insolvency affects state and local governments' ability to raise
Government
money to finance public services and projects.
employers, moreover, depend on the good will of taxpayers. They
cannot easily raise taxes or divert funds from other sources.
Meanwhile, the current depressed economy translates to severe
budget problems for state and local governments across the
country.
The similarities between the public sector today and the
private sector of the early 1990s raise intriguing questions about
A number of large
possible solutions for the public sector.
manufacturing companies over the past two decades have turned
to defeasance VEBAs as a way to relieve crushing retiree health
benefit liabilities. VEBAs have existed in the Internal Revenue
Code (the "Code") since 1928 and have roots in employee-driven
"sickness" funds that go back into the 1800s. The traditional
VEBA under the Code is a type of tax-exempt trust in which assets
may accumulate free of federal income tax to fund certain kinds of
benefits, particularly health benefits. For most of VEBA history,
the trusts have been linked to employer-sponsored health
insurance plans, with employers in control of the terms and
conditions of the insurance benefits and the VEBAs' functioning
primarily as funding mechanisms.
The defeasance model,
however, moves beyond the traditional style of VEBA to establish
an independent trust offering health benefits, separate from an
employer plan, under the control of an independent board
ultimately responsible to VEBA participants.
This Article provides perspective on defeasance VEBAs as a
potential solution for public sector retiree health benefit
Toward this end, Section I describes the
commitments.
development of employment-based health insurance and retiree
health benefits in both the public and private sectors. Section II
provides an overview of the problems that eventually arose to
threaten the provision of retiree health benefits, particularly in
the wake of FAS 106 and GASB 45. Section III surveys private
sector employer responses to FAS 106 and possible public sector
employer responses to GASB 45. Section IV discusses VEBAs,
giving both background on traditional VEBAs and explaining the
rise of the defeasance VEBA model. Section V then compares the
situation in which public sector employers today find themselves
with the circumstances that prompted the rise of the stand-alone
VEBA in the private sector, highlighting the distinct similarities
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between the two.
I.

RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

A. Background
The employer-sponsored health insurance system had been
developing slowly in the United States, but became entrenched
following World War 11.6 After 1950, when a series of collective
bargaining agreements between the UAW and the Detroit Big
Three established health insurance as a standard employee benefit
for union employees, 7 coverage under employer-sponsored
insurance expanded steadily. An estimated ninety-three million
individuals participated in employer-sponsored health plans by
1958;8 employer plans covered more than 60% of the active private
sector workforce by 1964;9 and more than 70% of the non-elderly
population enjoyed employment-based health coverage by 1977.10
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, employers appear to have
remained relatively unconcerned about the cost of health
benefits.11 Eventually, however, exploding costs reversed coverage
6. COLIN GORDON, DEAD ON ARRIVAL 21 (2003) (reporting that at least
two-thirds of employers with more than 250 employees, and more than 50% of
smaller employers, sponsored health insurance plans by the late 1940s). For a
range of discussions of the growth of the U.S. employment-based health
insurance system, see JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS,
LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA'S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE
(2003); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS: A
CONNECTION AT RISK (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 1993)
[hereinafter IOM]; JOHN E. MURRAY, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN HEALTH
INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL SICKNESS FUNDS (2007); JILL
QUADAGNO, ONE NATION, UNINSURED (2005); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
7. See Teresa Ghilarducci, The New Treaty of Detroit: Are VEBAs Labor's
Way Forward?,LABOR IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 241 (Clair Brown et al.
eds., 2009) (discussing the five-year collective bargaining agreements between
the automakers and workers in which the workers agreed not to strike in
exchange for productivity-based wages).
8. IOM, supra note 6, at 71.
9. GORDON, supra note 6, at 29.
10. Jon R. Gabel, Job-Based Health Insurance, 1977-1998: The Accidental
System Under Scrutiny, 18 HEALTH AFF. 62, 65, ex. 1 (1999) (estimating that,
in 1977, 70.5% of the non-elderly population had employment-based coverage).
Coverage levels remained stable through most of the 1980s: in 1987, an
estimated 70.9% of the non-elderly population had employment-based
coverage. Id.
11. See, e.g., Michael S. Gordon, Introduction to the Second Edition: ERISA
in the 21st Century, EMP. BENEFITS LAw, at lxviii (Steven J. Sacher et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2000) ("Unlike pension plans, there was no crisis in health plans in
1974 ....
Nor was there evidence of potentially out-of-control medical cost
inflation, nor of new and dramatically high-priced medical technologies, the
use of which would become the norm, rather than the exception . ...
[E]mployer-provided health insurance was cheap and plentiful.").
This
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trends in the private sector. 12 From 1960 through 2008, employers
moved from spending approximately $25 billion per year on group
health insurance policies to $545 billion. 13 By 2006, only about
55% of the non-elderly population still enjoyed employer-sponsored
14
health coverage.
Many state government employee health insurance plans
originated during the same mid-century era as private sector
plans.' 5 For example, Alabama enacted legislation creating its
situation may help explain the concurrent expansion of retiree health benefits.
Id.; see infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Alain C. Enthoven & Victor R. Fuchs, Employment-Based
Health Insurance: Past, Present and Future, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1538, 1539
(2006) (discussing how employment-based coverage peaked in the 1980s and
has since declined). LISA CLEMENS COPE & BOWEN GARRETT, HENRY J. KAISER
FAM. FOUND., CHANGES IN EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE
SPONSORSHIP, ELIGIBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION: 2001 TO 2005 13 (2006),
(reviewing the
available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7599.pdf
declining levels of employer-sponsored coverage in the early 2000s).
13. HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., WAGES AND BENEFITS: A LONG-TERM
VIEW (Nov. 2008), http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chcm012808oth.cfm
#front3.
14. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE U.S.: 2006 58, tbl. C-1 (2007). It is important to distinguish
between having "access to medical benefits" and having "coverage." More
individuals are eligible to elect health insurance through an employer than
actually choose to do so, whether for financial or other reasons. See, e.g., U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS"), Economic News Release:
28,
2009,
2009, July
U.S.,
Mar.
in
the
Benefits
Employee
[hereinafter BLS Economic
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ebs2.nr0.htm
News Release] (reporting that approximately 70% of U.S. private sector
employees had access to employment-based coverage in March 2009).
15. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Employee Health
(last visited
Benefits, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/stateemploy.htm
Dec. 22, 2009) (noting that most states have provided health insurance
benefits to employees for "decades"). Some states may have allowed state
agencies to negotiate their own benefit packages but did not consolidate the
programs into single state-wide employee health insurance plans until the
1970s. For example, before July 1974, individual state agencies negotiated
their own benefits packages in Idaho; the state consolidated those efforts into
a single state employees' benefit plan effective for the 1975 fiscal year. See
OFFICE OF INS. MGMT., STATE EMPLOYEE INSURANCE BENEFITS, FACT SHEET 1
(Jan. 2002), available at http://adm.idaho.gov/insurance/grplFactsheetl-02.pdf.
See also NORTH DAKOTA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED
JUNE 30, 2008 5 (Nov. 28, 2008), available at http://www.nd.gov/ndpers/formsand-publications/publications/2008-annual-report.pdf (indicating that North
Dakota implemented its group health insurance plan for active and retired
employees in 1971); Or. Rev. Stat. § 243-135 (1971) (indicating that Oregon
did the same); Employees Retirement System of Texas, History of ERS,
http://www.ers.state.tx.us/ htdocs/about/history/default.aspx (last visited Mar.
14, 2009) (stating that Texas implemented its consolidated group health
insurance plan for state employees in 1975); WEST VIRGINIA PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES INSURANCE AGENCY, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL
REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2003 1 (2003) (reporting that

The John Marshall Law Review

[42:879

State Employees' Insurance Board in 1965.16 California extended
health insurance benefits to state employees in 1962.17 Louisiana
in 1950 authorized state agencies to pursue health benefits for
state employees; by 1970, the legislature had consolidated state
employee health insurance benefits. 18 Massachusetts established
its Group Insurance Commission in 1955 to provide health
insurance benefits, among other benefits, to state employees. 19 As
early as 1943, Nevada permitted local governmental entities to
establish group health insurance plans for employees. 20 A statewide Public Employees' Benefit Program was established in
1963.21 New Jersey created the Division of Pensions and Benefits
in 1955 to administer its retirement funds and State Health
Benefits Plan. 22 New York established its New York State Health
Insurance Plan for state employees in 1957.23 Utah implemented
a state employees' health plan in 1961-today known as the Public
Employees Health Program-through the Group Insurance
Division in the Utah State Department of Finance. 24 Wisconsin
created a Group Insurance Board in 1959 to oversee state
25
employee health and life insurance benefits.
Government benefits have traditionally been generous.
Public sector employers contend that government compensation
rates are lower than those in the private sector and that benefits
must be comparatively more generous to attract and retain
West Virginia established its Public Employees Insurance Agency in 1971).
16. 1965 Ala. Laws 833. See also Alabama State Employees' Insurance
Board, State Employees' Insurance Board, http://www.alseib.org/Aboutl (last
visited Mar. 14, 2009) (describing the establishment of Alabama's Insurance
Board).
17. Cal. Public Employees Retirement System, Facts at a Glance: General,
Sept. 2009, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eipdocs/about/facts/general.pdf.
18. Office of Group Benefits, OGB History, https://www.groupbenefits.
org/portal/page/portal30/SHARED/O/OGBWEB/HISTORY (last visited Mar.
14, 2009).
19. Mass. Exec. Office for Admin. & Finance, Who is the GIC?,
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=afmodulechunk&L=4&LO=Home&Ll=Insuranc
e+%26+Retirement&L2=Oversight+Agencies&L3=Group+Insurance+Commis
sion&sid=Eoaf&b=terminalcontent&f=gic-whoisgic-who-is-gic&csid=Eoaf
(last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
20. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 287.010 (1943).
21. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 287.043 (1963).
22. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:18A-95 (2009); see also N.J. Dep't of Treas.,
Division of Pensions and Benefits, Establishment of the Division,
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/index2.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2009) (describing the establishment of the Division).
23. New York State Dept. of Civil Service, New York State Health Insurance
Plan, http://www.cs.state.ny.us/nyship/nyship.cfm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
24. Public Employees Health Plan, http://www.pehp.org/ (last visited Mar.
14, 2009).
25. State of Wisconsin Department of Employee Trust Funds, 2006
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (Dec. 15, 2008), available at
http://etf.wi.gov/about/2006 cafr.pdf.
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desirable employees. 26 A full 88% of all full-time state and local
government employees thus had "access to ... medical benefits" in
March 2009, a much higher percentage than the 70% in the
private sector.2 7 Public employers also tend to shoulder more of
the cost burden than private employers. Thus, for example, the
Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2009 found
that government employers offset a greater percentage (90%) of
the cost of premiums for employee-only coverage than did private
employers (80%).28 In fact, according to one news report, public
sector employers in 2007 spent about 72.8% more on benefits per
29
employee than did private sector employers in the same period.
Notwithstanding their historic generosity, public employers
are subject to the same healthcare cost challenges as their private
counterparts. Many state government health plans have faced
dramatic premium increases in recent years. For example, in
2002, premium costs increased in thirty-seven states by an
average of about 12.8%. 30 As a result, state health plans have
begun to increase co-payments and deductibles, and comparatively
few now pay the entire premium cost even for employees. 3 1 A
number of states are also experimenting with more creative ways
to reduce healthcare costs in an effort to manage expenses. 32 For
example, the National Conference of State Legislatures in 2009
reported at least nine states charge smokers higher premiums
than non-smokers, and a number of states have implemented
33
wellness programs, with and without financial incentives.
B. Expansion of Retiree Health Benefits
Retiree health benefits did not develop at the same pace as
active employee insurance. Of individuals over age sixty-five in
1962 with some form of health insurance coverage, only 21% had
coverage
through a prior employer-i.e.,
retiree health
26. HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.

EMPLOYER

HEALTH

BENEFITS:

& HEALTH

RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST,

2007 SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS

1 (2007),

http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/Summary-of-Findings-EHBS-2007.p

df.
27. BLS Economic News Release, supra note 14.
28. Id.
29. Jeremy Caplan, Government Jobs Looking Better in the Downturn,
TIME, Nov. 22, 2008, availableat http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,
8599,1860 886,00.html.
30. HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST,
KAISERIHRET SURVEY 2002 STATE EMPLOYEE HEALTH PLANS 1 (2003),

http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/Kaiser-HRET-Survey-2002-State-Employ
ee-Health-Plans-Report.pdf.
31. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 15. In 2009, only
fourteen states covered the entire premium cost for "a basic or 'standard'
health plan for some or all individual state employees." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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insurance. 34 From the outset, retiree health benefits were much
less generous than those available to active employees. For
example, although the Detroit automakers in 1953 began to allow
retirees age sixty-five or older to purchase the same health
insurance available to active employees, the companies charged
35
retirees the full price of that coverage.
After the mid-1960s, however, retiree health benefits
expanded. There are a variety of possible explanations, and the
growth in these benefits likely reflects some happy coincidence of
factors. As a preliminary matter, employers through the early
1970s simply did not see health insurance benefits as a significant
cost. 36 Insurers often contributed to this perception by treating
retiree benefits as a no-additional-cost coverage item. 37 Then, the
passage of Medicare in 196538 made retiree health benefits even
less expensive for employers.
Medicare amended the Social
Security Act to create a national health insurance system that
today covers the overwhelming majority of Americans age 65 and
older. 39 Although Medicare does not provide comprehensive
coverage, 40 it offers a substantial insurance foundation. With

34. SYLVESTER S. SCHIEBER, TIAA-CREF INSTITUTE, RECRUITMENT,
RETENTION AND RETIREMENT: THE FUTURE OF RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (2004), http://www.tiaacrefinstitute.org/pdf/research/speechespapers/040104d.pdf (citing Dorothy P.
Rice, Health Insurance of the Aged and Their Hospital Utilization in 1962:
Findings of the 1963 Survey of the Aged, 27 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 9
(1964)).
35. QUADAGNO, supra note 6, at 148. By the early 1960s, however, the
UAW negotiated full benefits for union retirees at all three Detroit
automakers. UAW, Chronology: Social and Economic Progressfor Autoworkers
and America, http://www.uaw.org/barg/03fbarg09.cfm (last visited Aug. 19,

2008).
36. See GORDON, supra note 6, at 34.
37. Interview by Editor with Steven J. Sacher, Jones Day, VEBAs: The
Answer to HealthcareBenefit Costs for Retirees?, Metropolitan Corp. Couns. 49
(Feb. 2008), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2008/February/
49.pdf ("[I]n order to obtain the employer's business in covering active
employees, the insurance companies often agreed to cover retirees without
additional cost to the employer. Needless to say, many employers accepted the
offer.").
38. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395-1395iii (2006)).
39. The statute provides Medicare to all "[i]ndividuals who are age sixtyfive or over and are eligible for retirement benefits under subchapter II of [the
Social Security Act] .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006).
40. Medicare beneficiaries remain subject to premiums, cost-sharing
payments, benefit caps and deductibles; and in some cases-such as, most
notably, prescription drug coverage before 2006-Medicare simply does not
cover a particular type of expense. For example, under Medicare Part A
(Medicare's traditional hospitalization insurance), most beneficiaries do not
pay a premium. 42 U.S.C. § 1395e (2006). They do, however, face a range of
costs tied to a so-called "spell of illness." 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a) (2006). Those
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Medicare as the base, employers could-and did-create relatively
inexpensive retiree health benefit packages that supplemented the
government system. 41
Retirees typically remained on their
employer plans, but the plans paid only after Medicare financed
the first-dollar costs. Retiree health benefits thus became "wraparound" plans. In its early years, Medicare contained relatively
few limits on what providers could charge, 42 a major cost issue for
costs in 2009 included a $1,068 deductible for the first sixty days of inpatient
hospital care, plus a $267 per day co-payment for each of the next thirty days
(days 61-90). After ninety days of inpatient hospital care in a spell of illness,
the beneficiary begins to dip into what are called "lifetime reserve days" for
which a beneficiary must pay a $534 per day co-payment for any "lifetime
reserve" days (days after the first ninety days of inpatient hospital care in any
single spell of illness, limited to a maximum of sixty without regard to the
number of spells of illness).

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICARE SERVS.,

MEDICARE
AND
YOU
2009
112
(2008),
available
at
http://www.medicare.gov/PublicationsPubs/pdf/10050.pdf.
Under Medicare
Part B (traditional Medicare's coverage for physician and other provider
services and equipment), beneficiaries pay an income-adjusted premium that
in 2009 started at $96.40 per month, plus an annual deductible ($135 in 2009)
and 20% co-insurance for most covered services and equipment. Id. at 119-21.
As a result, even with Medicare, beneficiaries can quickly incur significant
out-of-pocket costs. See, e.g., DAVID GROSS & NORMANDY BRANGAN, AARP
PUB. POLICY INST., OUT-OF-POCKET SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE BY MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES AGE 65 AND OLDER: 1999 PROJECTIONS 1 (1999),

http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenterlhealth/ib4lhspend.pdf.
See
generally
MARILYN MOON, MEDICARE: A POLICY PRIMER (2006) (examining the history
of Medicare and predictions for its future).
41. PATRICIA H. BORN & ALICE M. ZAWACKI, CTR. FOR ECON. STUDIES, U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MANUFACTURING FIRMS' DECISIONS REGARDING
RETIREE HEALTH INSURANCE (2003), www.ces.census.gov/index.php/ces/
cespapers?downkey=101680.
See also SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING,
UNITED STATES SENATE, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1996, S.Rep. No. 105-36,

at 191 (1997), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibincpquery/35?&sid=c
p l05y827t&lf=1&l_fle=list/cplO5cs.lst&hdcount=50&l_t=417&refer=&rn=
sr036vl.105&dbid=105&item=35&sel--TOC 613108& ("Employers could offer
health benefits to their retirees with the assurance that the Federal
Government would pay for many of the medical costs incurred by company
retirees age 65 and older."); ROBERT L. CLARK ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF AN

AGING SOCIETY 115 (2004) (noting that the availability of retiree health
insurance, beginning in the 1960s, reduced the cost of retirement); Robert L.
Clark et al., Retiree Health Insurance and Pension Coverage: Variations by
Firm Characteristics,49 J. GERONTOLOGY S53, S53 (1994) [hereinafter Clark
et al., Retiree Health Insurance] ("Provisions for the extension of health
coverage after retirement were introduced into many employer-sponsored
health plans beginning in the late 1960s. The widespread adoption of retiree
health plans paralleled the establishment of Medicare. In fact, many plans
were developed in close coordination with Medicare.").
42. JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 31 (2003)

('Medicare's benefits, reimbursement mechanisms, administration, and
structure of insurance all reflected prevailing practices in the American
private sector [in 1965]. In concrete terms, this meant that Medicare followed
the Blue Cross-Blue Shield model of health insurance; ... and paid physicians
and hospitals generously, retrospectively, and with little oversight.").
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Medicare 43 but a boon for retiree health plans that paid after
Medicare.
In addition to the cost savings realized from piggybacking on
Medicare, employers could afford to be generous because the
retiree population remained small as compared to active workers.
For example, in 1960, every retired worker in the U.S. was
supported, statistically, by five active workers. 44
In 1970,
approximately 13.35 million retired workers received Social
Security retirement benefits 45 while ninety-three million workers
paid into the system in that year 46-a ratio of roughly seven active
for every one retired worker. Employers also typically paid for
retiree health benefits on a year-by-year basis, with no required
financial recognition or disclosure of long-term costs. 47 As long as
they were meeting the expenses year by year, employers were
comfortable. For unionized employers, retiree health benefits
became "virtually a 'throwaway' in negotiations" 48 because
employers could make what they perceived as an almost-irrelevant
future promise in exchange for a desired current concession from
the union. 49 Some employers also enhanced retiree health benefits

43. Id. at 84. Medicare's financial crises eventually led to significant
provider payment reforms in the 1980s. Medicare adopted a system of
prospective payment with diagnosis-related groups. Rather than simply
reimbursing hospitals whatever costs they incurred treating Medicare
patients, the new model would pay hospitals a predetermined set rate
based on the patient's diagnosis. The payment would be unrelated to
any specific hospital's costs. Instead, it would be a national payment
based on the average costs of a general hospital.
RICK MAYES & ROBERT A. BERENSON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT &
THE SHAPING OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 31 (2006).
44. Alden Skar, Talkin' "Bout My Generation:The Challenges and Changes
of a Maturing Workforce, EMP. BENEFIT PLAN REV., Feb. 2007, at 8, 10.
45. Specifically, 13,352,145 retired workers received Social Security
retirement benefits in 1970. Social Security Administration, Social Security
Beneficiary Statistics, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/OA benies.html (last
visited July 8, 2009).
46. In 1970, of the approximately 93,090,000 covered workers (meaning
those with earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes), about 6,270,000
were self-employed. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT 4.30 tbl. 4.B11, http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/t4bll.pdf (last
visited July 8, 2009) [hereinafter SSA, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT].
47. FAS 106, supra note 4, at 167, App. D (noting that when the FASB
added "other postemployment benefits" to its project list in 1979, it did so
because "[elvidence suggested that most large employers, as well as many
smaller ones, provided health care and life insurance benefits to their retirees
and were accounting for those benefits on a pay-as-you-go (cash) basis.
Existing accounting pronouncements did not cover postretirement benefits
provided outside a pension plan.").
48. SCHIEBER, supra note 34, at 20.
49. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., RETIREE HEALTH PLANS: HEALTH
BENEFITS NOT SECURE UNDER
GAO/HRD-93-125, at 1 (1993).
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to shrink workforces during the recession years of the 1970s. 50
Following the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA") in 1967, employers risked discrimination lawsuits if
they terminated older workers. 51 But, providing health insurance
to early retirees could induce older workers to leave voluntarily
and avoided ADEA concerns. By 1988, about 66% of all private
sector employers with 200 or more employees provided retiree
52
health insurance as a core benefit.
In the public sector, retiree health benefit coverage in the
mid-1980s was lower than in the private sector. By 1987 only
about 48% of all state and local government retirees under the age
of sixty-five (44% of those ages sixty-five or older) participated in
retiree health plans.5 3 Over the next two decades, however, state
and local governments increased coverage.
By 1997,
approximately 62% of local governments offered retiree health
benefits to early (pre-Medicare) retirees, and 47% did the same for
Medicare-eligible retirees. 54 State governments covered 76% of
pre-Medicare retirees by 1997 and 69% of Medicare-eligible
retirees. 55 Over the next five years, local government coverage
slipped to 55% for pre-Medicare retirees and 35% for Medicareeligible retirees, 56 but state governments expanded coverage to
92% for pre-Medicare retirees and 86% for Medicare-eligible
retirees.57 By 2007, an overwhelming 98% of state and larger local
government employers reported that they offered retiree
healthcare benefits to pre-Medicare retirees, with 81% also
58
offering such benefits to Medicare-eligible retirees.

50.

ROLAND

D.

MCDEVITT ET AL., WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, RETIREE

HEALTH BENEFITS: TIME TO RESUSCITATE? 2-3 (2002), available at http:/!

www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/w559.pdf.
51. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006)).
52. HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEWITT ASSOC., RETIREE HEALTH
BENEFITS EXAMINED: FINDINGS FROM THE KAISER/HEWITT 2006 SURVEY ON
RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 1 (2006), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7587.
pdf [hereinafter KAISER/HEWITT 2006 RETIREE SURVEY].

53. Allan P. Blostin et al., Disability and InsurancePlans in the Public and
Private Sectors, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1988, at 9, 10, available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1988/12/art2 full.pdf.
54. Paul Fronstin, The Impact of the Erosion of Retiree Health Benefits on
Workers and Retirees, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF No. 279,
Mar. 2005, at 5 fig. 2, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0305ib.pdf.
The survey covered only local governments with 250 to 999 employees. Id.
55. Id. at fig. 3.
56. Id. at fig. 2.
57. Id. at fig. 3.
58. HENRY KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST,
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007 ANNUAL SURVEY 158 ex. 11.5 (2007),
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/sections/upload/7672_Section-1
1.pdf. This survey does not distinguish state from local government employers
but covers only employers with at least 200 employees. Id.
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Exactly why public sector retiree health benefits expanded
after the 1980s is unclear. One explanation may lie in the
prevailing public employer view that enhanced benefits offer the
best way to compete for desirable employees. For example, state
and local government employers in 2008 characterized "retiree
health care benefits as central to their recruitment, retention, and
retirement timing goals . . . ."59 The increase in retiree benefits
may also reflect a reaction to economic stresses in the early 1990s.
Public sector employers are generally forced to balance budgets
annually, or at least on a biennial basis. 60 As a result, they have
comparatively little flexibility when finances are tight. During the
recession years of the early 1990s, state and local government
employees faced wage freezes and furlough days as their
employers struggled to reduce current expenses and balance
budgets.6 1 At the same time, however, government employers
could increase retiree health benefits without any immediate
impact on their financial statements. 62 The increase in retiree
health benefits over the early years of this period may thus
constitute a reaction to limits on other areas of employee
63
compensation.

II.

PROBLEMS ARISE WITH RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS

A perfect storm hit private sector retiree health benefits after
the mid-1980s. Healthcare costs overall had skyrocketed since the
1960s.6 4 By the early 1990s, employers were intensely focused on

59. CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV'T EXCELLENCE, RETIREE HEALTH
IN THE AMERICAN STATES 1 (2008), available at http://www.slge.org.

CARE

60. AcADEMYHEALTH, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., STATE OF THE
STATES: CHARTING A COURSE: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, LEARNING FROM

THE PAST 10 (2009), available at http://www.statecoverage.org/files/
State%20ofo2Othe%2OStates-2009.pdf.
61. Michael Cimini et al., Negotiated Wage Changes in Government, 1992,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1993, at 34, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/m
lr/1993/06/art4full.pdf. See also Michael H. Cimini, Negotiated Changes in
State and Local Government Contracts, 1993, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 1994,
at 3, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1994/08/arti full.pdf (discussing
the impact of a difficult economic climate on public sector collective bargaining
agreements).
62. FAS 106 became effective for most private sector employers at the end
of 1992, but no accounting rule forced government employer recognition of
long-term liability for retiree health benefits before GASB 45 was published in
2004. See FAS 106, supra note 4, at 9, and GASB 45, supra note 5.
63. The initial expansion of the U.S. employment-based health insurance
system may be attributed in part to World War II wage controls, which did not
apply to employment-based benefits, implemented during World War II. 1OM,
supra note 6, at 70 ("In a war economy with labor shortages, employer
contributions for employee health benefits became a means of maneuvering
around wage controls.").
64. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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finding some way to control their health benefit expenses. 65 Long
gone was the halcyon era when employers worried about pension
expenses, not healthcare. 66 Retiree health benefits offered a
natural target because they tended to be more expensive for
employers than active employee benefits. One study of large
employers in 2004 found that retiree healthcare costs accounted
for 29% of their total healthcare expenses in that year. 67 Older
individuals statistically are simply less healthy-and thus, more
expensive-than younger persons. 68 The elderly also have far
higher prescription drug costs than younger people, 69 and
Medicare historically provided almost no coverage of outpatient
prescription drug costs. 70 Before the introduction of Medicare Part
D prescription drug coverage in 2006, employment-based retiree
health plans served as the single largest source of prescription
71
drug coverage for the elderly.

65. See Thomas P. Burke & Rita S. Jain, Trends in Employer-Provided
Health Care Benefits, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1991, at 24, available at
http://stats.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1991/O2/art3full.pdf
(describing how managed
care grew out of employer efforts to control healthcare expenses).
66. See Gordon, supra note 11, at xviii.
67. HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEWITT Assoc., CURRENT TRENDS
AND FUTURE OUTLOOK FOR RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: FINDINGS FROM THE
KAISER/HEwITT 2004 SURVEY ON RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 1 (2004),
http://www.kff.org/medicare/7194.
68. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, JAN.-SEPT. 2008 NATIONAL HEALTH
INTERVIEW SURVEY, fig. 11.3, (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/early
release/200903_1l.pdf (reporting that, in the 2008 National Health Interview
Survey, only 39.3% of individuals age 65 or older reported themselves as in
"excellent or very good health" as compared with 82.4% of those under age 18
and 65% of those age 18-64).
69. The Future of Retiree Health Benefits: Challenges and Options: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on
Educ. & the Workforce, 106th Cong. ex. 4 (2001) (statement of Patricia
Neuman, Vice President & Director, Medicare Pol'y Project, Henry J. Kaiser
Fam. Found.), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/6010-index.cfm
(reporting that adults between the ages of 65 and 74 fill approximately four
times more prescriptions per year than do adults below the age of 45).
70. Medicare did not offer comprehensive outpatient prescription drug
coverage until the implementation of Part D in January 2006. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395w-101 (2003). See Jonathan Oberlander, Through the Looking Glass:
The Politics of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 187, 188 (Apr. 2007)
(detailing the complicated background of Medicare Part D; Thomas R. Oliver
et al., A Political History of Medicare and Prescription Drug Coverage, 82
MILBANK
QUARTERLY
283,
316-17
(2004),
available
at
http://www.kff.org/medicarelloader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&
PageID=42275 (reviewing the treatment of prescription drug coverage in
Medicare and the impact of Medicare Part D).
71. A 2003 study reviewing elderly prescription drug coverage before
Medicare Part D found that 29% of the elderly obtained prescription drug
coverage through employer-sponsored plans. Dana Gelb Safran et al.,
Prescription Drug Coverage and Seniors: Findings from a 2003 National
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Increasing healthcare costs in the 1970s and 1980s also
affected Medicare, creating a ripple effect among employer plans
offering wrap-around coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees. In
an effort to rein in Medicare costs, Congress in the 1980s imposed
a number of payment reforms that pushed financial risk at least
partially onto providers. 72 Providers responded by shifting their
unreimbursed costs to private insurance payors, and the process
translated into higher costs for employers7 -- the primary source of
private insurance. This process helped to undercut the financial
boost that Medicare had given retiree health benefits in the late
74
1960s and early 1970s.
Demographic changes with related retiree health cost impact
also began to affect employers by the early 1990s because the U.S.
population had been steadily aging. 75 In 1960, only 9.2% of the
population was age sixty-five or older; by 1980 that demographic
had grown to 11.3%; and by 1990 it had reached 12.6%.76 From
the mid-1960s through at least the mid-1990s, U.S. employers also
experienced a trend of earlier and longer retirements. 77 Not
surprisingly, the ratio of active to retired employees nationwide

Survey,
HEALTH AFF. W5-152,
W5-160
ex. 4,
Apr.
19,
2005,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.152vl?ijkey=Gn1EKoVV
rGMv.&keytype=ref&siteid=healthaff.
Another 20% purchased
private
Medicare supplemental or other insurance to obtain coverage. Id.
72. The prospective payment system and diagnosis-related groups meant
that hospitals, for example, could collect only relatively fixed amounts, no
matter how much a particular patient's care actually cost, MOON, supra note
40, at 59-65.
73. RICK MAYES & ROBERTA. BERENSON, supra note 43, at 73-74.
74. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
75. WAN HE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005
1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf ('The
U.S. older population grew rapidly for most of the 20th century, from 3.1
million in 1900 to 35.0 million in 2000. Except during the 1990s, the growth of
the older population outpaced that of the total population and the population
under age 65.").
76. Id. at 9, tbl. 2-1 (noting that the percentage slipped slightly over the
1990s to 12.4% by 2000). See also U.S. Census Bureau, An Older and More
Diverse Nation by Midcentury, U.S. Census Bureau Newsroom (Aug. 14, 2008),
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/01249
6.html (explaining that the percentage of older Americans is expected to rise
dramatically in the twenty-first century). The press release continues, "In
2030, because all of the baby boomers will be 65 and older, nearly one in five
U.S. residents is expected to be 65 and older. Id. This age group is projected to
increase to 88.5 million in 2050, more than doubling the number in 2008 (38.7
million)." Id.
77. Murray Gendell, Trends in Retirement Age in Four Countries, 1965-95,
MONTHLY
LAB.
REVIEW,
Aug.
1998,
at
22-24,
available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1998/08/art2full.pdf (reporting that the length of
time American men lived after retirement increased significantly between
1960 and 1990).
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shrank from the early 1970s through the next two decades. 78 For
example, the number of retired workers drawing Social Security
retirement benefits increased from 13.35 million in 1970 to 25.76
million in 1992. 7 9 Over the same years, the number of workers
paying into the system increased from about 93 million to about
134 million.8 0 Thus, only slightly more than five active workers
(about 5.2) paid into Social Security for every retired worker in
1992 as compared to the 1970 ratio of closer to seven active
workers (about 6.97) to one retired worker.8 ' For those employers
who provided retiree health insurance, these trends meant that
more and more aging individuals with potentially expensive health
issues were joining the retiree plans at the same time that fewer
active workers were boosting the companies' productivity.
Beginning in the late 1970s, economic challenges that struck
manufacturing industries--those historically with generous
benefits-exacerbated the problem.8 2
After about 1980,
manufacturing industries steadily shed jobs instead of increasing
or even maintaining stable employment figures.8 3 The numbers
could be stark for individual companies. For example, in 1980,
70,000 active employees at Bethlehem Steel supported 54,000
retirees; by 1985, the active workforce had shrunk almost in
half-to only 37,000 active workers-while the number of retirees
had grown to 70,000.84
By the late 1990s, GM reportedly
85
supported 400,000 retirees with only 180,000 active employees.
Then, in the early 1990s, the country moved into another

78. Various explanations have been offered, including the aging U.S.
population, increased life expectancy, early retirement trends, and slowed
hiring practices. Clark et al, Retiree Health Insurance, supra note 41, at S53.
79. Specifically, 25,757,727 retired workers received Social Security
retirement benefits in 1992. Social Security Administration, Social Security
Beneficiary Statistics, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/OAbenies.html (last
visited July 8, 2009). By 2008, that number had increased to 32,273,145
retired workers receiving Social Security retirement benefits. Id.
80. SSA, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 46, at Table 4.B11.
The numbers have continued to increase. Id. In 2005, 159,703,000 workersincluding more than 16 million self-employed individuals-were paying into
the Social Security system. Id.
81. The active-to-retired worker ratio is expected to drop considerably more
in the future. Some projections indicate that by 2030 there will be only two
active workers for every retiree. Skar, supra note 44, at 10.
82.
Ronald E. Kutscher, Historical Trends, 1950-92, and Current
Uncertainties, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 1993, at 3, 5-6, available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1993/11/artlfull.pdf.
83. Id. at 6 (stating that manufacturing employment "peaked" in 1979 at
about 21,040,000 jobs, but had dropped to about 18,040,000 jobs by 1992). In
1950, manufacturing industries employed almost 34% of all American
workers; by 1992 they had dropped to only about 16.6% of the non-farm
workforce. Id.
84. QUADAGNO, supra note 6, at 149.
85. Jeff Madrick, Empty Nest Egg, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, at BR 6.
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recession, with another 600,000 manufacturing job losses (among
86
other signs of economic downturn).
Despite
increasing
healthcare
costs,
challenging
demographics, and a faltering economy, private sector employers
might have muddled along well into the 1990s by implementing
various strategies to curb retiree benefit expenses just as they
were doing with active employee health plans.8 7 After all, they
were funding both on a pay-as-you-go basis. As long as they could
meet their annual benefit expenses, employers might have
continued to let long-term future retiree health commitments build
up for the sake of current employee goodwill. But that was not to
be. Instead, a day of reckoning arrived for private sector retiree
health plans in the unlikely form of an accounting rule. FAS 106
became effective for most companies in late 1992 and required
affected companies to include in current financial statements the
88
expected cost of future retiree health benefit commitments.
Although FAS 106 did not actually increase obligations, it forced
recognition of the true cost of past promises.8 9 The accumulating
liabilities turned out to be enormous. As early as 1986, some
estimates pegged the retiree health liabilities of the Fortune 500
at approximately $2 trillion when assets of those companies
totaled only about $1.3 trillion. 90 Recognizing the accumulated
cost of those eventual commitments torpedoed corporate balance
sheets. Ford took a $7.5 billion charge in one year; GM estimated
in 1992 that it would have to account for between $16 billion to
$24 billion to reflect its accrued postretirement health benefit

86. Christopher J. Singleton, Industry Employment and the 1990-01
Recession, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 1993, at 15, 20, available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1993/07/art2full.pdf.
87. See Burke & Jain, supranote 65 and accompanying text.
88. FAS 106, supra note 4, at 4. See also FASB, Summary of Statement No.
106: Employers' Accounting for PostretirementBenefits Other Than Pensions
(1990),
http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsuml06.shtml
("[A]lthough
it
applies to all forms of postretirement benefits, this Statement focuses
principally on postretirement health care benefits."). The Summary continues,
"It will significantly change the prevalent current practice of accounting for
postretirement benefits on a pay-as-you-go (cash) basis by requiring accrual,
during the years that the employee renders the necessary service, of the
expected cost of providing those benefits to an employee and the employee's
beneficiaries and covered dependents." Id.
89. Admittedly, FAS 106 could be viewed simply as "a formal
acknowledgment of obligations that were always there." Milt Freudenheim,
Banks Look Hard at Cost of Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at D2. One
banker, discussing the impact of FAS 106 on the auto companies, noted that
the banks had "a 'high awareness' for years of the auto companies' promises,
made long ago in union contracts, which were not reflected on financial
statements." Id.
90. Pat Widder, Benefit Deals Face Retirement; Navistar Neither First Nor
Last to Cut, CHICAGO TRIB., Aug. 30, 1992, at C1.

VEBAs to the Rescue

20091

liability. 91 At the time, overall FAS 106 disclosure was expected to
drop corporate earnings of the Fortune 500 by 15 to 20% in the
92
first year.
More than a decade passed before GASB-the public sector
equivalent of the Financial Accounting Standards Board-in 2004
issued Statement No. 45, Accounting and Financial Reporting by
93
Employers for Postemployment Benefits Other Than Pensions.
The Statement effectively paralleled the reporting requirements
imposed on private employers by FAS 106. 94 GASB 45 pushes
state and local governments to adopt the same approach private
sector public companies follow: reflecting unfunded accrued
liabilities for retiree health and welfare benefits (often called
"other postemployment benefits" or "OPEB") in current financial
reports. GASB noted that government financial statements were
incomplete because "most governments report their cash outlays
for OPEB in a given year, rather than the cost to the employer of
OPEB earned by employees in that year," and because the two
figures "may be vastly different."95 As with FAS 106, the GASB
standards do not "mandate the funding of OPEB benefits;" 96 but
they do require accurate reporting of the present value of future
benefit promises. 97
Nonetheless, GASB 45 has spawned
tremendous focus on the looming financial risk of retiree medical
98
benefit liabilities for both state and local governments.
As with private sector retiree health costs in the early 1990s,
the public sector accumulated massive liability for these benefits.

91. Milt Freudenheim, Companies Reducing Benefits Promised for Their
Retirees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at Al.
92. Widder, supra note 90, at Cl.
93. GASB 45, supra note 5. GASB also issued GASB, STATEMENT NO. 43,
FINANCIAL

REPORTING

FOR

POSTEMPLOYMENT

BENEFITS

OTHER

THAN

PENSIONS, in 2004 to require similar reporting for trusts and other conduits
used to prefund benefits. Id.
94. GASB 45, supra note 5.
95. GASB, OTHER POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: A PLAIN-LANGUAGE
SUMMARY OF GASB STATEMENTS NO. 43 AND No. 45 1 (2004), available at
httplwww.Gasb.org/ pruject-pages/opeb-summary.pdf [hereinafter GASB
PLAIN-LANGUAGE SUMMARY].

96. Id. at 9.
97. See GASB, STATEMENT. NO. 45 ON OPEB ACCOUNTING BY GOV'TS: A
FEW BASIC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2004) (stating that "[sltatement 45 was
issued to provide more complete, reliable and decision-useful financial
reporting regarding the costs and financial obligations that governments incur
when they provide postemployment benefits other than pensions (OPEB) as
part of the compensation for services rendered by their employees.").
98. See CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV'T EXCELLENCE, BALANCING DOLLARS
AND HEALTH SENSE: A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION MAKING ON FUNDING
STATE
RETIREE
HEALTH
CARE
BENEFITS,
June
2008,

http://www.slge.org/vertical/Sites/%7BA26O1E1DF-5AEE-4590-84C4-876EFE1

E4032%7D/uploads/%785D473689-13FB-4EB2-BC23-OFD5BBC1D49E%7D.pd

f.
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Taken as a group, state and local governments face unfunded
retiree health costs estimated between $600 million and $1.6
trillion.99 For some employers, these liabilities could consume
much of their annual budgets. Duluth, Minnesota, for example,
has computed its GASB 45 liability to be more than double the city
budget, and the Los Angeles school district has calculated its
liability at approximately 80% of its annual budget. 10 0 Like many
private employers, most state and local governments apparently
failed to consider the long-term financial consequences of their
retiree medical benefit commitments. 101
Most public sector
10 2
employers have funded these benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis,
appropriating funds each year for that year's benefit expenses
alone.10 3 Only a few employers have set aside assets to cover
1
future medical expenses. 04

99. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE & LOCAL GOV'T RETIREE
BENEFITS: CURRENT FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION AND HEALTH BENEFITS,
REPORT NO. GAO-08-223 3 (2008); see also PEW CTR. ON THE STATES,
PROMISES WITH A PRICE: PUBLIC SECTOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS 7, 41, 45
(2007), available at http:lwww.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedfiles/
Promises%20with%20a%20Price.pdf (pegging the unfunded cost of retiree
health care and other non-pension benefit obligations at about $370 billion at
the end of the 2006 fiscal year). The liabilities appear to rest with state and
larger local governments as one 2008 survey determined that most small
governments--those serving populations of 5000 or less-have few employees
and rarely offer any form of health benefits, much less retiree benefits. Study
Examines Local Governments' Responses to Health-Care Costs, GASB 45, 24
GOV'T. FIN. REV. 4 (2008).

100. Samuel H. Fleet, Cities and Counties Feeling Pressure on Reporting
Retiree Health Benefits, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Mar. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/Issues/2007/1 1/Pages/Cities-AndCounties-Feeling-Pressure-On-ReportingRetireeHealthBenefits.aspx?k=Citi
es+and+Counties+Feeling+Pressure.
101. The executive director of the Chicago Transit Authority's pension fund,
which has been funding retiree health care since 1980, observed in late 2006,
that "[t]here were decisions taken years ago that seemed harmless at the time,
but now they're very problematic." Mary Williams Walsh, PayingHealth Care
from Pension Proves Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2006, at Al. Even with
GASB 45 looming, public sector employers did not move quickly to respond;
the magnitude of the liabilities "induced near paralysis among policymakers
and administrators across the nation as GASB 45 has kicked in and brought
retiree health care costs out of the basement, where public employers have
kept them buried for years." Samuel H. Fleet, GASB 45 Words of Wisdom:
Don't Just Stand There-Do Something!, EMP. BENEFITS PLAN REV. 18, 18
(2007).
102. According to GASB, most state and local governments "pay . . . an

amount each year equal to the benefits distributed or claimed in that year."
GASB PLAIN-LANGUAGE SUMMARY, supra note 95.
103. J. RALPH CROSS, UNIV. OF TENN. MUNICIPAL TECHNICAL ADVISORY

SERVICE, GASB STATEMENT No. 45 (2007), available at http://www.mtas/
tennessee.edu/knowledgebase.nsf/printerfriendlyproductweb?openform&paren
tUNID=D46F003F45A5C 16A852572C00042F614.
104. At the end of fiscal year 2006, only six states (Arizona, North Dakota,
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Growing economic woes have accelerated the challenge for
government employers. As of July 2009, more than forty-five
105
states reported "revenue shortfalls of about $40 billion."
Because of legal obligations to balance their budgets, 106 state and
local governments typically "must close budget gaps by cutting
expenditures, raising tax revenues, or drawing from rainy day
funds or reserves."'1 7 State and local governments often borrow to
meet many of their immediate obligations, and their borrowing
costs depend heavily upon their credit ratings. With credit rating
agencies reported to be paying close attention to GASB 45
reporting, 08 public sector employers are necessarily concerned
about the impact of retiree health liabilities on their future
borrowing ability. 10 9

Ohio, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin) were on target to fund their promised
retiree health and other welfare benefits fully over the next thirty years, but
only Alaska, Arizona and Wisconsin had "funded more than 50 percent of their
actuarial liability." PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 99, at 7, 43. None of
the five largest states--California, Texas, New York, Florida and Illinois-had
done any pre-funding whatever. Id. at 43. The Pew study found that at least
thirteen states had established trusts of some kind in order to pre-fund the
Id. at 7. Some public sector employers directed pension fund
benefits.
surpluses in the 1980s to year-by-year retiree health costs, a strategy that is
permitted under the Code but is not without its own risks. 26 U.S.C. § 420
(2006); see Walsh, supra note 101, at Al (noting that this tactic can have a
deleterious impact because it reduces the excess assets available to fund
future pension benefits).
105. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 15 (noting that
the financial challenge "places pressure on health benefit programs to seek
fiscal savings").
106. ACADEMYHEALTH, supra note 60, at 9-10.
107. Id. at 10.
108. See, e.g., Gov't Finance Review, Fitch Ratings Weighs in on Credit
Implications of GASB 45, 24 GOV'T. FIN. REV. 21, 21 (2005) [hereinafter Fitch
Ratings Weighs in] (quoting a report from Fitch that stated, "Fitch Ratings
views GASB 45 as a positive step toward more fully illuminating
governmental obligations to retirees" and also "over time, a lack of substantive
progress in funding and managing OPEB liabilities or a failure to develop a
realistic plan to meet annual OPEB contributions could adversely affect an
issuer's credit rating."). See also Parry Young, Funding OPEB Liabilities, 21
GOV'T. FIN. REV. 10, 14 (2005) (providing Standard & Poor's view that "[i]f any
changes resulting from OPEB have the effect of adversely affecting an
employer's financial position or flexibility, then credit quality may suffer.").
109. See PAULA SANFORD, NAT'L CTR. FOR STUDIES OF COUNTIES,
IMPLEMENTATION OF GASB 45: CASE STUDIES OF 15 COUNTIES 24 (2007),
available at http://www.naco.org/Content/ContentGroups/Specialsp-2007-1210-GASB-45.pdf (explaining that credit-rating agencies "[p]rovide opinions on
the credit worthiness of state and local governments to lenders who use this
information to determine whether and at what interest rate they will loan
In addition, "for many
money (e.g., buy bonds ... ) to governments.").
governments, a high credit rating is [a] source of pride because it reflects the
fiscal health and management practice of the organization." Id.
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EMPLOYER RESPONSES TO RETIREE
HEALTH BENEFIT LIABILITIES

FAS 106 proved the last straw for many private employers'
retiree health commitments1 10 as many companies chose to
terminate retiree health plans."1 Between 1988 and 1991 alone,
as FAS 106 loomed, the number of large companies offering retiree
health benefits dropped by 20%.112 By 2006, only 38% of large
employers still offered retiree health plans. 113 At first, employers
faced litigation and questions as to their right to terminate retiree
health plans, 114 but over time it became clear that perceived
lifetime retiree health benefit "guarantees" were far less secure
than most retirees imagined. 115 The one exception proved to be
collectively bargained plans, where unions could continue to insist
on preserving the retiree benefits. Although even unionized
retirees have found retiree health benefits less stable than they
expected, 116 clearly the presence of a union tends to improve the
chances of ongoing retiree health insurance. Despite the overall
decline in retiree health insurance, 11 7 86% of collectively bargained
employers, large and small, continued to offer retiree health
benefits in 2006.118
Unionized or not, most surviving retiree health plans tried to
control costs by imposing cost-sharing obligations on retirees. For

110. Anna M. Rappaport, FAS 106 and Strategies for Managing Retiree
Health Benefits, 17 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS MGMT. 37, 37 (2001).
111. See Freudenheim, supra note 91, at Al (asserting that "[a]t least 23
large companies have abandoned the health benefits that they were providing
to thousands of retired employees. Dozens more have announced that they
will not provide coverage for future retirees, and most employers who still
offer the benefits are reducing their share of the costs, which have been
climbing steeply.").
112. HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEwITT Assoc., EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2003 ANNUAL SURVEY ex. 11.1 (2003), http://www.kff.org/
insurance/ehbs2003-13-chart.cfm#1.
113. KAISERIHEWITT 2006 RETIREE SURVEY, supra note 52, at 5.
114. Clark at al., Retiree Health Insurance,supra note 41, at S53.
115. See generally Donald T. Weckstein, The Problematic Provision and
Protection of Health and Welfare Benefits for Retirees, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
101 (1987); Steven J. Sacher, Retiree Health Benefit Cutbacks: Issueman
Attempts to Untangle the Web, 20 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 1242 (1993);
Larry Grudzien, The Great Vanishing Benefit, Employer Provided Retiree
Medical Benefits: The Problem and PossibleSolutions, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
785 (2006); David A. Pratt, The Past, Present and Future of Retiree Health
Benefits, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 103 (2007); Richard L. Kaplan et al.,
Retirees at Risk: The PrecariousPromise of Post-Employment Health Benefits,
9 YALE J. HEALTH POLY, L. & ETHICS 287 (2009).
116. William T. Payne & Pamela Ewing, Union-Negotiated Lifetime Retiree
Health Benefits: Promise or Illusion, 9 MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR 319, 356
(2008).
117. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
118. KAISER/HEWITT 2006 RETIREE SURVEY, supra note 52, at 3.
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example, a 2006 survey found that 81% of employers imposed
deductibles and 91% required retiree premium contributions. 19
Employers sometimes tightened eligibility provisions, requiring
20
older ages and longer periods of service to qualify for benefits.'
121
Many employers adopted caps on total retiree health expenses,
often in direct reaction to FAS 106.122 For example, in 1992,
Caterpillar, Inc. announced that it would begin capping retiree
health benefits in 2000 at whatever the 1999 cost turned out to be
and would shift any additional costs to retirees by imposing
premiums. 123 Similarly, Detroit Diesel announced a cap on its
retiree health insurance contributions in the early 1990s in
response to FAS 106.124
Employers also responded to rising costs by adopting
defeasance VEBA models, sometimes in conjunction with caps. A
defeasance VEBA allows an employer to reach an agreement with
the applicable union to fund a stand-alone, tax-exempt trust that
125
assumes full responsibility for all future retiree health benefits.
Once the trust is funded as agreed, the employer is released from
liability. An independent board of trustees, answerable ultimately
to retirees, runs the trust and manages an independent health
plan the trust establishes to provide the requisite retiree health
benefits. Defeasance VEBAs have appeared only with unionized
private sector employers because non-unionized private sector
employers generally can terminate retiree health benefits they
cannot afford 126 and because the Code provides tax advantages for
collectively bargained VEBAs that are not available to other
VEBAs.127
However, even collectively bargained private sector
employees have little reason to agree to a defeasance VEBA unless

119. Id. at 7 (regarding deductibles), 16 (regarding premiums).
120. Id. at 20.
121. Of the large firms surveyed in 2006, half had placed a cap on their
contributions to retiree health benefits in their largest plan for Medicareeligible retirees, and 61% of the surveyed employers with a cap had already
reached that cap. Id. at 13, 14.
122. Id. at 13.
123. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Winnett v. Caterpillar, No. 3:06CV-0235, 2006 WL 5328387 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 5, 2006).
Eventually,
Caterpillar agreed with its union to establish a defeasance VEBA to assist
with costs above the cap. See infra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
124. Wood v. Detroit Diesel Corp., No. 05-74106, 2005 WL 3579169, at *8

(E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2005).
125. Aaron Bernstein, Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard Law School,
MATTERS, Apr.
2006, at 7.
126. See Ellen O'Brien, AARP Public Policy Inst., What Do the New Auto
Industry VEBA's Mean for Current and Future Retirees?, INSIGHT ON THE
ISSUES, Mar. 2008, at 2 (noting that employers can change benefits any time
in the absence of a firm contract with employees).
127. See infra notes 179-186 and accompanying text.
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financial considerations otherwise make long-term preservation of
bargained-for benefits unlikely. 128 For this reason, defeasance
VEBAs have appeared in the private sector exclusively in the
129
context of struggling--usually failing-industries.
130
Because GASB 45 is so new, it remains unclear what path
the public sector will take.' 3 ' One expert phrased the dilemma for
states as follows: "You can put money aside to fund benefits or you
can change benefits so as to reduce future costs."' 132 GASB 45
provides an incentive for funding by permitting use of a higher
discount (interest) rate in computing total OPEB liability for
funded benefits, 33 but funding poses practical problems for
government employers. 3 4 If a government does choose to fund
retiree health benefits, it can take several tax-advantaged
routes. 135
Funding a traditional VEBA will allow assets to

128. See infra notes 253-259 and accompanying text.
129. See infra Section IV.B.
130. The GASB requirements phased in over a three-year period beginning
in 2006. GASB PLAIN-LANGUAGE SUMMARY, supra note 95, at 11. Larger
governmental entities, with total annual revenues in excess of $100 million,
were required to comply beginning December 15, 2006, while smaller
government entities, with total annual revenues under $10 million, were
required to comply beginning after December 15, 2008. Id.
131. See Fleet, GASB 45 Words of Wisdom, supra note 101, at 19 (outlining a
number of possible options). See also Young, Funding OPEB Liabilities, supra
note 108 (detailing Standard & Poor's rating agency's analysis of options).
Texas has taken an aggressive position against GASB 45, arguing that it has
the right to terminate or curtail retiree health benefits as it chooses and thus
has no liability for future benefits. John E. Petersen, Lassoing GASB 45,
GOVERNING, May 1, 2007, http://www.governing.com/column/lassoing-gasb-45.
Texas has gone as far as proposing legislation to block implementation of the
rule.
H.D. 2365, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007), available at
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/billtextpdf/HB02365I.pdf;
Robert
Elder, Texas Revolts Against Benefits Reporting Rule, Austin AmericanStatesman, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.statesman.comlsearch
/content/region/legislature/stories/03/08/8govaccount.html.
132. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 99, at 48. A Credit Suisse
analysis of the issue concluded that, "[w]hen you get down to it, there are only
two simple options: (1) shrink the obligation and/or (2) set aside more assets.
Maybe there is another option: A state or local government could simply bury
its head in the sand, ignoring the entire matter (probably not the most
prudent path)."
DAVID ZION & AMIT VARSHNEY, CREDIT SUISSE, YOU
DROPPED A BOMB ON ME, GASB: UNCOVERING $1.5 TRILLION IN HIDDEN
OPEB LIABILITIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GovTs' 16 (2007).
133. J.P. MORGAN ASSET MANAGEMENT, THE OPEB CHALLENGE: MAPPING A
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYERS 6, 13 (2008).
134. Id. at 13.
135. See Segal Company, In Search of OPEB Remedies: Good Medicine
Includes Managing Retiree Health Care Costs, BENEFITS, COMPENSATION AND
HR CONSULTING, PUBLIC SECTOR LETTER, Nov. 2007, at 1-2, available at
http://www.segalco.com/uploads/7c77fbb8edf05Of3O056d819047ddld4.pdf
(discussing the various trust and other options available to government
employers).
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accumulate, tax-free and protected from other government
budgeting needs, for future healthcare costs; employees and
retirees are not taxed on either contributions to or payments from
a VEBA for health benefits. 136 In addition to traditional VEBAs,
government
employers
can
establish
so-called
"115
trusts"--grantor trusts established by governments for a variety of
purposes that can include funding benefits. 137 Because Code
Section 115 exempts any income accruing to any governmental
entity or derived from the "exercise of any essential government
functions" from federal income tax,1 38 115 trusts enjoy the same
tax benefits as VEBAs without the VEBA restrictions. Public
sector employers may also establish a medical subaccount,
referred to as a "Section 401(h) account," within a qualified
pension plan to fund retiree health benefits. 139 None of these prefunding options has been popular to date. For example, in one
survey of state plans, 48% said they were "unlikely to adopt," and
36% said they were "very unlikely to adopt," a VEBA. 140
Thus far, most states appear unwilling to take the path of the
private sector and start cutting benefits. For example, 72% of
state plan administrators reported that it was "very unlikely" that
their state would "[ilntroduce a plan that will terminate health
care for future retirees" in the next five years, and 76% reported
that it was "very unlikely" that their state would "[tierminate all
subsidies for current retirees."'141 Even if they wanted to reduce
benefits, state and local government employers are heavily
unionized, 142 with benefit protections subject to collective
bargaining. Some states even have statutory or constitutional
prohibitions that appear to prevent cutback or termination of

136. See infra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
137. 26 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
138. Code Section 115 provides that "gross income" for purposes of the
Internal Revenue Code does not include either "(1) income derived from any
public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and
accruing to a State or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of
Columbia" or "(2) income accruing to the government of any possession of the
United States, or any political subdivision thereof." 26 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
139. 26 U.S.C. § 401(h) (2006).
140. CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV'T EXCELLENCE, supra note 59, at 6, tbl. 5.
Similarly, 48% said they were "unlikely to adopt," and 32% said they were
"very unlikely to adopt," a 401(h) account. States were somewhat more
positive about 115 trusts, with 28% reporting that they were 'likely to adopt"
such a pre-funding option, but another 32% still reported they were "unlikely
to adopt" such a trust and 20% reported themselves as "very unlikely to
adopt." Id.
141. Id. at 7, tbl. 7.
142. Union membership in the public sector in 2008 was 36.8% as compared
to only 7.6% in the private sector. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Union
Members in 2008, (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release
/pdflunion2.pdf.
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retiree health benefits for state employees. 143 For example, a 2006
survey of state and local government retiree health plans found
that 62% of the surveyed employers were limited in making
changes due to statutory or regulatory provisions, 25% were
subject to collective bargaining agreements, and another 17% cited
144
other factors constraining their flexibility.
The states have not been immune to cost containment,
however. In a survey administered between late 2007 and early
2008, 66% of state retiree health plans in the past five years had
increased both retiree contributions to premiums and retiree copayments for prescription drugs, 68% had increased dependent
premium contributions, 56% had increased retiree co-payments,
and 46% had increased deductibles. 145 States are also pursuing a
wide range of other cost-management techniques, 146 including
147
defined contribution or consumer-directed health plans.
One additional option for state and local governments is
issuing debt in the form of OPEB funding bonds to raise money
specifically to pay for retiree health benefits. 148 Although seen as
a sensible approach by some, this alternative depends on adequate
149
investment of the proceeds and carries its own set of risks.
Many governments have issued bonds to cover retiree pension
benefits, but those benefits are fixed in amount in a way

143. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE & LOCAL GOV'T RETIREE
BENEFITS: CURRENT STATUS OF BENEFIT STRUCTURES, PROTECTIONS, AND
FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR FUNDING FUTURE COSTS, REPORT No. GAO-07-1156 18

(2007). See generally John Sanchez, The Vesting, Modification, and Financing
of Public Retiree Health Benefits in Light of New Accounting Rules, 41 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1147 (2008) (discussing various restraints on modification
of public retiree health benefits). There is some doubt as to whether legal
restraints on benefit modification or termination are as effective as sometimes
perceived. See Kaplan, supra note 115, at 302-04.
144. Segal Company, Results of the Segal Medicare Part D Survey of Public
Sector
Plans, SURVEY, Summer
2006,
at
3,
available at
http://www.segalco.com/uploads/c3880a0050db7ld5f61fde95c07d8541 .pdf.
145. CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV'T EXCELLENCE, supra note 59, at 9, tbl.

11.
146. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 15.
147. Options for cost management also include caps on total employer
contributions, changing eligibility requirements and revising coordination
with Medicare. J.P. MORGAN ASSET MANAGEMENT, supra note 133, at 29.
North Carolina, for example, raised service requirements from five to twenty
years for an employee to vest in retiree health benefits. Jonathan Walters,
Paying for Promises, 20 GOVERNING 32, 32 (2007).
148. Wisconsin issued a bond in 2005 to help finance its retiree health
benefits. Walters, supra note 147, at 32 (quoting Parry Young, head of public
finance for Standard & Poor's rating agency, saying: 'What we're looking for is
a thoughtful plan on how they're going to manage this liability.").
149. See Fitch Ratings Weigh in, supra note 108, at 1 (stating that "failure to
follow balanced and prudent investment practices could expose the plan
sponsor to market losses").
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healthcare benefits are not.150 Moreover, if investment returns lag
the rate of interest due on the bonds-a scenario easily imagined
in light of the 2008-2009 financial climate-a government could
find itself not only losing money on an OPEB bond, but also failing
151
to meet increasing retiree health costs.
IV.

VEBAs, TRADITIONAL AND OTHERWISE

A. Background on VEBAs
Although not called VEBAs at the outset, employment-based
associations organized as early as the mid-1800s to provide
financial assistance for workers in times of illness or injury. 152 By
the early part of the 1900s, such organizations covered significant
portions of the working population. 153 Although often supported
by employers in various ways,154 a hallmark of these VEBA
predecessors was the level of employee control; typically,
employees administered and largely funded the associations
themselves. 155 So popular were these associations that, when a
156
tax court ruling threatened to treat them as taxable entities,
Congress promptly responded by creating VEBAs as a separate
15 7
type of tax-exempt trust under the Code.
150. ERIC S. BERMAN & ELIZABETH K. KEATING, PIONEER INST. FOR PUBLIC
POLICY RESEARCH, THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: UNFUNDED PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE HEALTH CARE BENEFITS AND GASB 45 19-20 (2006), available at
http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/pdf/06-gasb-45-elephant in theroom.pdf
(noting a long list of concerns with OPEB bonds and citing a Barron's report
that concluded "[r]etiree health-care bonds could be very risky for the issuer.
States issuing the bonds might have to pay higher rates on subsequent bond
issues for bridges, roads and schools-even if their ratings are unaffected by
the new debt--simply to attract more buyers.").
151. Id. at 20-21 ("[T]he investment return may, in some years, be less than
the cost increases of health care, thereby increasing its OPEB costs during a
period of economic weakness.").
Some public entities also may not have
authority to issue such bonds. Id. at 19.
152. Such organizations are sometimes referred to as "industrial sickness
funds."
See John E. Murray, Industrial Sickness Funds, US, EH NET
ENCYCLOPEDIA, June 5, 2008, http://eblnet/encyclopedialarticle/murray.
industrial.sickness (explaining that "industrial sickness funds" were used to
describe "funds organized by companies.., and by labor unions.").
153. Professor Murray notes that industrial sickness funds, along with
charitable groups known as fraternal associations, "covered 30 to 40 percent of
non-agricultural wage workers in the more industrialized states" by World
War I. Id.
154. See Paul Tharp, GM's $nazzy New Model: VEBA, N.Y. POST, Sept. 27,
2007, at 91 (stating that "VEBAs were created as tax shelters for giant coal
and steel companies at the turn of the century to help pay for worker injuries
and widows' benefits").
155. IOM, supra note 6, at 51-53.
156. Philadelphia & Reading Relief Ass'n, 4 B.T.A. 713, 715 (1926).
157. Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, 45 Stat. 791, 814.
Although the legislative history is quite limited, the section was
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Today's Code definition of a VEBA remains virtually identical
to its 1928 counterpart: "[v]oluntary employees' beneficiary
associations providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or
other benefits to the members of such association or their
159
A VEBA is only one type of organization
*.".."158
dependents .
exempt from federal income tax under Code Section 501(a), 160 but
it is particularly useful because it permits the accumulation of
assets on a tax-exempt basis--with comparatively little
regulation-to pay for various types of welfare benefits. When a
VEBA provides health benefits, the same tax advantages for
beneficiaries apply as with other employment-based health plans.
Thus, Code Section 105 excludes from a beneficiary's income any
payments from a VEBA for accident or health benefits, 161 and
Code Section 106 similarly excludes from a beneficiary's income
62
any employer contributions to the VEBA.1
Most VEBA rules appear in the underlying Treasury
Regulations. The Regulations specify the key qualifications for
any VEBA: that there must be an "association of employees" whose
membership in the VEBA is "voluntary; that the VEBA must exist
only to pay for approved types of benefits; and that "no part of its
net earnings may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual except in the form of the permissible benefit
payments."1 63 The Regulations further explain that the phrase
"sick and accident benefits" means "amounts furnished to or on
behalf of a member or a member's dependents in the event of

apparently designed to save employee relief associations from tax after
the courts had held in various cases that they could not qualify under
various other provisions as local associations of employees or fraternal
beneficiary organizations or benevolent life insurance companies.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,942 (Apr. 27, 1979).
158. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(9) (2006).
In the current version of the VEBA
definition, the phrase "or designated beneficiaries" follows after "dependents,"
but the language otherwise mirrors the 1928 wording. See Revenue Act of
1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, 45 Stat. 791, 814. From 1939 until 1969, the Code
contained a counterpart to Code Section 501(c)(9) for VEBAs for "individuals
who are officers or employees of the United States Government .... " See
Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 702; Tax Reform Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 580-1 (1969).
159. Governing Treasury Regulations require that a VEBA exists as a legal
entity "independent of the member-employees or their employer." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(9)-2(c)(1) (1981). VEBAs today usually take the form of a trust. See
29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006); DAVID S. DUNKLE, VEBAS AND OTHER SELFINSURED ARRANGEMENTS, 395-2ND,TAx MGMT. PORTFOLIOS IV.C.5 (1993).
160. 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 501(c)(1)-(28) (2006).
161. 26 U.S.C. § 105(b) (2006). See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-03-024 (Oct. 19,
1977) (determining that health benefits paid to the employees are not included
in the employees' gross income).
162. 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006). See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-03-024 (Oct. 19,
1977).
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-l(a)-(d) (1981).
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illness or personal injury to a member or dependent."1 64
Preventive care payments "designed to safeguard or improve the
health of members and their dependents" also qualify as "sick and
accident benefits."165 A VEBA may provide the benefits either
through direct reimbursement to an individual "for amounts
expended because of illness or personal injury, or through the
payment of premiums to a medical benefit or health insurance
166
program.'
The Regulations also require that a VEBA be "controlled (i)
[b]y its membership, (ii) [b]y independent trustee(s)... or (iii) [b]y
trustees or other fiduciaries at least some of whom are designated
by, or on behalf of, the membership."' 167 Any VEBA that also
qualifies as an "employee welfare benefit plan" under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA')168 and is
subject to ERISA's rules, including fiduciary restrictions, is
deemed to qualify as "controlled" by independent trustees.1 69 The
typical VEBA combines a tax-exempt trust with an employersponsored, employer-managed health benefit plan, with some
combination of employer and employee funds deposited into the
VEBA trust each year to pay for healthcare expenses for plan
beneficiaries. The employer sponsoring the related health benefit
164. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-3(c) (1981).

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(c)(3)(i)-(iii) (1981).
As an example of
sufficient "control by or on behalf of the membership," the Regulations
describe a trust created to fund a health insurance benefit plan established
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between a labor union and an
employer. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(c)(3)(iii) (1981). In that example, some of
the trustees are appointed by the union and some by the employer. Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(c)(4) ex. 1 (1981). According to the example, the benefit
plan agreement and trust "together create a voluntary employees' beneficiary
association over which the employees possess the requisite control through the
trustees designated by their representative [union]." Id.
168. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006)) ("ERISA").
ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" as
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program
was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance
or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or
benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training
programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title
(other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide
such pensions).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).
169. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2(c)(3) (1981).
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plan controls the details of the health plan. Thus, the employersponsor determines what will be covered and how much,
establishes annual premiums and deductibles, and typically
shoulders a significant percentage of the overall cost of
maintaining health benefits for employees. Because the typical
private sector, employer-run VEBA is so entwined with an
employee-sponsored health insurance plan, such a VEBA qualifies
as an "employee welfare benefit plan" under ERISA17o satisfying
the Code's requirements for VEBA management and also
subjecting private sector employer plan sponsors to ERISA's
fiduciary protections for participants. 171
Throughout the middle decades of the 20th century, VEBAs
existed primarily as a background funding vehicle for employersponsored health plans. Unfortunately, with little regulatory
attention being paid, 172 VEBAs also became a convenient corporate
tax shelter. Congress reacted in 1969 by extending unrelated
173
business income tax ("UBIT") provisions to VEBA operations.
Concern persisted, however, that VEBAs were being used
In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
inappropriately. 174
17
("DEFRA"), 5 Congress targeted the use of VEBAs as a tax shelter
for private, non-unionized companies, 176 adding nondiscrimination
170. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006) includes employee welfare benefit plans as

covered plans for the fiduciary rules of ERISA. Code Section 1104 details
ERISA's fiduciary provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006).
172. Regulations under Code Section 501(c)(9) were not even proposed until
1969, and those were not finalized until 1980. Voluntary Employees'
Beneficiary Associations, 34 Fed. Reg. 1028 (proposed Jan. 23, 1969)
(withdrawn); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(9)-1-8 (1981).
173. U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 537-8
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(9) (1969)). UBIT applies to any VEBA income
that exceeds so-called "exempt function income" (generally, employer
contributions for benefit payments and administrative costs and investment
income used for the same purposes). 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(b), 511-513 (2006).
174. See John H. Eggertsen & Michael J. Hainer, Recent Tax Act Affects
Employee Benefit Plans, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21, 1985, at 15 (stating that "closely
held and professional corporations often used group insurance contracts and
VEBAs as investment vehicles to defer compensation for highly compensated
employees/shareholders").
175. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 [hereinafter DEFRA], Pub. L. No. 98-369,
98 Stat. 494.
176. See Eggerston, supra note 174, at 15 (noting that Congress imposed
reserve limits and nondiscrimination rules on VEBAs); Thomas Porcano,
Reconsidering Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Associations Under the
DEFRA, 16 TAX ADVISOR 130, 130 (1985) (noting that the changes came in
response to abusive use of VEBAs to lower tax costs): Russell E. Greenblatt,
Planning for VEBAs Under the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 62 TAXES 605, 605
(1984) (detailing the major changes under the act); John H. Eggertsen &
Michael J. Hainer, Tax Act: Changes Affecting Many Group Insurance
Contracts and VEBAs, 64 MICH. B.J. 932, 932 (1985) (describing that the law
was meant to provide the same tax treatment regardless of whether the
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requirements 177 and imposing contribution deduction limits under
Code Sections 419 and 419A.178
The nondiscrimination
restrictions do not apply, however, to any VEBA that is "part of a
plan"'179 maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement.1 80 Contributions to a VEBA maintained pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement are also exempt from the DEFRA
deduction limits,' 8 ' allowing employers with union health plans to
182
deduct VEBA contributions largely without restriction.
Similarly, because Code Sections 419 and 419A target only
employer tax deductions, tax-exempt employers such as
governmental entities are by their nature removed from the reach
of these limits.
DEFRA's limits also affected the UBIT provisions for VEBAs,
linking the calculation of UBIT to an employer's ability to deduct
contributions to the trust. 83 After DEFRA, only about one taxable
year's worth of health benefit expenses may be contributed by
most employers to a VEBA without becoming taxable, 184 in effect
negating any long-term potential for tax-free accumulation of
assets through the trust. This limit does not apply to VEBAs
funded pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, however,

employer paid benefits directly from general assets, purchased group
insurance, or established a separate trust fund that held employer
contributions in reserve).
177. 26 U.S.C. § 505(b) (2006).
178. DEFRA, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 854-60. Before the DEFRA,
employer contributions to VEBAs were deductible under the Code Section 162
ordinary and necessary business expense rules. DEFRA, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
98 Stat. 854. The DEFRA provided instead that employer contributions to a
"welfare benefit fund" (which includes a VEBA providing medical benefits) are
deductible under Code Section 419, not Code Section 162. Id. Code Sections
419 and 419A then work together to restrict private, non-unionized employers
to a maximum annual deduction equal, generally, to one year's benefit costs
plus a small reserve. 26 U.S.C. §§ 419, 419A (2006). See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-10T at A-2 (1992) (explaining the applicability of 26 U.S.C. §§ 419,
419A).
179. 26 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1), (b) (2006).
180. 26 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2) (2006).
181. 26 U.S.C. § 419A(f)(5) (2006). The Code states that "[n]o account limits
shall apply in the case of any qualified asset account under a separate welfare
benefit fund ... under a collective bargaining agreement." Id. Temporary
Treasury Regulations under Code Section 419A provide further that "neither
contributions to nor reserves of such a collectively bargained welfare benefit
fund shall be treated as exceeding the otherwise applicable limits of section
419(b), 419A(b), or 512(a)(3)(E) until the earlier of [various dates tied to the
publication of final regulations under Code Section 419A]." Such final
regulations have yet to be published." Temp Treas. Reg. § 1.419A-2T (1985).
182. 26 U.S.C. § 419A(f)(5) (2006). Deductibility of contributions remains
subject to the requirement that they qualify as ordinary and necessary
business expenses under Code Section 162(a). 26 U.S.C. § 419(a) (2006).
183. 26 U.S.C. § 512(a)(3)(E) (2006).
184. 26 U.S.C. § 419A(c)(1) (2006).
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because employer tax deductions for contributions to such VEBAs
are not limited.185 Similarly, the Code specifically exempts a
VEBA from the UBIT limit "if substantially all of the contributions
to the [VEBA] are made by employers who were exempt from tax.
.,186 VEBAs connected to governmental employers thus enjoy
the same pre-funding ability and UBIT relief that union VEBAs
do.
B. Development of Defeasance or Stand-Alone VEBAs
87
By 2008, the IRS reported the existence of 11,996 VEBAs,1
but they were not all the same. Along the way, a new VEBA
variation-today often referred to as a "defeasance" or "standalone" VEBA--developed. 8 8 The new style began to appear in the
early 1990s after FAS 106 became effective. In 1992, Navistar
International Corporation (formerly International Harvester)
established a VEBA to offload $2.6 billion in hourly retiree health
costs while the company struggled with massive losses. 89
Navistar and the UAW agreed to a range of concessions (such as
premiums, deductibles, and co-payments) that reduced the
company's liability to $1 billion, which the company contributed to
the VEBA primarily in the form of stock. 190 The VEBA then
assumed responsibility for retiree health benefits.' 9' In 1998, the
UAW agreed with Caterpillar to establish a VEBA to be funded
with approximately $35 million to cover costs above the company's

185. See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text. See also I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 9401033 (Jan. 7, 1994) (stating that "[a]ccount limits do not apply to
any qualified asset account under a separate welfare benefit fund under a
collective bargaining agreement.").
186. 26 U.S.C. § 512(a)(3)(E)(iii) (2006).
187. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, I.R.S. DATA BOOK, 2008 56, tbl 25 (2009).
188. Bernstein, supra note 125, at 7-8.
189. O'Brien, supra note 126, at 4.
190. The company agreed to fund a VEBA with two subtrusts. Id. The first
subtrust received approximately $500 million in newly issued company stock
to pay current retiree expenses; Navistar promised to fund the second subtrust
with new stock that would represent approximately half of the company's
outstanding shares, operating on the theory that any increase in the stock's
value could be used to lower future retiree health costs. Id. See also Peggie R.
Elgin, Mosaic of Solutions Needed to Neutralize FAS 106 Liability, CORP.
CASHFLOW MAG. (Sept. 1993).
Jeannie Mandelker, Facing Deadline,
Businesses Are Shifting More Costs to Retirees, 11 Bus. & HEALTH 18 (1993).
191. Id. The VEBA survives today although its financial health is debatable.
According to one 2007 report, the Navistar VEBA is underfunded and has
been forced to increase retiree co-pays. David Welch & Nanette Burns, GM's
Health Plan Could Be Contagious, BUS. WK., Oct. 8, 2007, at 37. On the other
hand, UAW President Ron Gettelfinger, in an online Q&A discussion,
characterized the Navistar VEBA as being "in excellent shape." Q&A Live
Discussion with Ron Gettelfinger, Nov. 21, 2006, available at http://www.
uaw.org/talk/transcript/1 12106_rg2.cfm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
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previously announced retiree liability cap' 92-- a cap announced in
reaction to FAS 106.193 This VEBA was expressly structured to be
"independent of Caterpillar," 194 a key feature of the defeasance
model. According to Caterpillar, the company "made no promise to
provide any additional or future funding to the VEBA or to
otherwise pay for retiree health insurance costs above the
195
established caps."
In late 2006, the United Steelworkers ("USW") and Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Company negotiated a new contract that included
"the transfer of responsibility for all current and future retiree
health care liabilities for Goodyear's USW workforce to a VEBA
trust," funded by a one-time $1 billion contribution from the
company. 196 Goodyear committed to make at least $700 million of
its $1 billion contribution in cash and the remaining $300 million
in either common stock or cash. 197 Once the funding is completed,
192. Mem. of Law in Support of Caterpillar's Mot. to Dismiss, Winnett v.
Caterpillar, No. 3:06-CV-00235, 2006 WL 5328388, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 25,
2006).
One newspaper article reported that the UAW itself funded
approximately $32.3 million of the VEBA from a union training fund and an
overtime account fund. Paul Gordon, Caterpillar Warns Union of Escalating
Health Care for Workers, Retirees, J. STAR, Apr. 30, 2004. Another source
characterized the funding as a redistribution from overtime pay and training
funds for active employees. O'Brien, supra note 126, at 5.
193. See supra notes 88-92, 121-124 and accompanying text.
194. O'Brien, supra note 126, at 5.
195. Id. The Caterpillar VEBA has not fared well. See Rick Popely, Retiree
Health Tab Could Fall on UAW, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 2007, at Business C1
(explaining that the VEBA set up by Caterpillar ran out of funds seven years
after it was created). When the VEBA was exhausted (by October 2004) and
Caterpillar began charging retirees premiums, groups of hourly retirees sued
Caterpillar in 2006, and a federal district court judge in July 2007 certified the
class in a class action against Caterpillar. Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., No.
3:06-CV-00235, 2007 WL 2044098, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. July 12, 2007); Kerns v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-01113, 2007 WL 2044092, at *1 (M.D. Tenn.
July 12, 2007). Caterpillar subsequently sued several union locals and the
UAW, claiming that they should indemnify Caterpillar for any liability
resulting from the retirees' lawsuits in Winnett and Kerns. Kerns v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889 (M.D. Tenn. 2008); Winnett v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-00235, 2008 WL 1943995, at *1 (M.D. Tenn.
May 1, 2008). The company's lawsuits against certain locals were dismissed
on jurisdictional grounds in May 2008. Kerns, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 904;
Winnett, 2008 WL 1943995, at *16. A similar VEBA, negotiated by the UAW
with Detroit Diesel Corporation, also triggered litigation when the trust ran
short of funds. Wood v. Detroit Diesel Corp., No. 05-74106, 2005 WL 3579169,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2005).
196. Press Release, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., USW Ratifies Agreement
with Goodyear; Pact Provides Company Substantial Cost Savings, Dec. 29,
2006, availableat http://www.goodyear.comlmedia/pr/23411pl.html.
197. Id. The transaction was approved by a federal judge in August 2008 as
part of a settlement of a lawsuit brought by two Goodyear retirees. Redington
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 5:07-CV-1999, 2008 WL 3981461, at *19
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2008).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[42:879

Goodyear will remove its $1.2 billion liability for current and
future USW retirees from its balance sheet. 198 As is typical of a
defeasance VEBA, the agreement provided for the Goodyear VEBA
to be completely independent of the company and controlled by a
committee with "four Public Members who are healthcare,
employee benefits or ERISA experts, . . . three members appointed
by the USW, and ... two [employee representatives]. '"199
To
ensure the VEBA's independence from the company, the
settlement further specified that no member of the VEBA's
controlling committee "may be a current or former officer, director
or salaried employee of Goodyear" and that six of the nine
members (the so-called "Public Members" and the employee
representatives) cannot "have a financial or institutional
relationship with Goodyear or the USW if such relationship could
'200
have an impact on his or her judgment.
In early 2008, the USW settled a lawsuit with Continental
Tire North America over Continental Tire's unilateral modification
of retiree health benefits with an agreement that Continental Tire
would fund a VEBA for hourly retiree health benefits. 201 That
agreement provided for the VEBA to receive about $40 million
upfront in cash and to receive additional payments from the
company over a twenty-year period, for a total funding of
approximately $158 million in present value terms. 202
The
agreement also called for the VEBA to be controlled by a fivemember committee (composed of two union representatives but no
representatives from Continental Tire) with the power to establish
20 3
benefit levels, including raising or lowering coverage.
Similarly, an October 2007 settlement agreement between AK
Steel and one of its unions (covering approximately 4900 retirees)
provided for the establishment of a VEBA to be funded by the
204
company but managed "solely by the retirees' designees."
198. Redington, 2008 WL 3981461, at *12.
199. Id. at *5.
200. Id.
201. PR Newswire Europe, USW Lawsuit Results in Continental Tire
Agreeing to Provide Retiree Health Care, Apr. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressrelease/idusl 57159+16-Apr-2008+PRN20
080416. Continental Tire had apparently imposed an annual cap of $3,000 per
retiree, shifting significant expense to current retirees. Kristin G. Hunt, Tire
Company Settles Retiree Health Suit, 42 BUS. INS. 6, 6 (Apr. 21, 2008). The
USW sued the company and won in district court. Id.; Pringle v. Continental
Tire North America, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 2d 924, 934 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
202. Hunt, supra note 201, at 6. The VEBA is scheduled to become effective
in 2010, assuming court approval of the settlement agreement. Id.; Trial Mot.
Mem. & Aft., Pringle v. Continental Tire North America, Inc., No. 06-2985,
2008 WL 5740892 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 2008).
203. Trial Mot. Mem. & Aff., Pringle,2008 WL 5740892.
204. Press Release, AK Steel, U.S. Court Approves AK Steel's VEBA Health
Care Settlement with Middletown Works Retirees, Feb. 21, 2008, available at
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Funding was expected to take four years, but once completed, the
company will have no further liability for retiree health benefits
for the retirees covered by the VEBA. 205 AK Steel's contributions
20 6
to the VEBA are expected to total approximately $663 million,
but the company will reduce its balance sheet liability by about $1
billion. 20 7 A federal district court approved the agreement in
February 2008.208
Both GM and Ford established VEBAs in 2005 to help fund
retiree health benefits for union retirees. 20 9 After financial woes
triggered special negotiations with the UAW, GM agreed to
contribute approximately $3 billion in cash to a new VEBA over
the next six years, plus an additional $30 million a year in "profitsharing payments" over a seven-year period and about $8 million
in stock appreciation rights. 210 Similar negotiations between the
UAW and Ford resulted in a commitment from Ford to contribute
approximately $108 million in cash to a new VEBA over the next
six years, plus stock appreciation rights. 211 In both cases, the
UAW agreed to forego certain bargained-for compensation
increases and have those amounts-estimated for the GM VEBA
to be worth an additional $4 billion over a twenty-year
period-also contributed to the VEBAs.212 The 2005 VEBAs were
structured as independent trusts with the terms of the related
medical plans carefully negotiated as part of the bargaining
Moving away from the
agreements with the companies. 213
virtually free medical coverage that auto company retirees had
previously enjoyed, the 2005 negotiations shifted some costs to
retirees through premiums, deductibles and co-payments, with the
214
VEBAs' intended to offset some of the cost-sharing obligation.
The federal courts blessed the settlement agreements in August
2007.215

http://www.aksteel.com/news/press-release.aspx?doc-id=626&year=2008
[hereinafter AK Steel Press Release].
205. Press Release, ERISA Industry Committee, Court Approves VEBA for
AK Steel Retirees; UAW Files Suit Seeking Approval of VEBA Agreement with
GM, Mar. 3. 2008, available at http://www.eric.org/forms/documents/
DocumentFormPublic/view.
206. AK Steel Press Release, supra note 204.
207. Id.
208. Bailey v. AK Steel Corp., No. 1:06-CV-468, 2008 WL 495539, at *8-9
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2008).
209. Chrysler did not win special concessions in 2005 from the UAW.
210. UAW v. GM, 497 F.3d 615, 624 (6th Cir. 2007). See also Michael Ellis,
GM Health Care Details Emerge, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 3, 2005, at
Business 1 (detailing GM health-care cuts for UAW retirees and workers).
211. UAW, 497 F.3d at 624.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 615-37.
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All of these VEBAs--auto-related and otherwise-fade in
significance, however, compared to the VEBAs negotiated with the
UAW by the Detroit auto companies in late 2007. First with GM
and later with Ford and Chrysler, the UAW agreed to accept full
obligation for all union retiree health benefits, beginning in
January 2010, through a VEBA funded largely in advance by the
Big Three. 216 Under the GM agreement, the company committed
to a $24.1 billion upfront cash contribution to the VEBA, effective
January 2008, with up to twenty additional annual $165 million
"backstop" payments "any time the VEBA's funding level is
projected to be insufficient to provide current benefit levels for at
21 7
least 25 years from the date of the required payment."
Additional funding included a special security tied to GM stock
and contributions derived from foregone negotiated compensation
increases for current workers. 218 The agreement also maintained
certain caps on retiree cost-sharing obligations that were
negotiated under the 2005 settlement agreement, but only until
2011 when that agreement expires. 219 Even while touting the
commitments to preserve low increases in retiree cost-sharing, the
UAW acknowledged that "VEBA trustees may need to make
220
benefit adjustments to maintain long-term solvency."
Under the Ford agreement, the company promised to
contribute $15.4 billion to the VEBA, including $6.5 billion upfront
in cash beginning in January 2008 and fifteen $52 million annual
additional cash payments. 221 Funding for that VEBA also included
a note secured with Ford assets and other securities tied to Ford
stock, as well as the value of foregone wage increases by active
216. Ron Gettelfinger & Cal Ropson, A Message to UAW Retirees, UAW GM
REPORT, 2007, http://www.uaw.org/contracts/07/gm/gm07.php (last visited
Sept. 28, 2008); Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association on Behalf of UAW
Ford Retirees, UAW
FORD
REPORT
HOURLY
WORKERS,
2007,
http://www.uaw.org/contracts/O7/ford/hrly/ford-hrl1.php [hereinafter VEBA
on Behalf of Ford Retirees]; Voluntary Employee Benefit Association on Behalf
of UAW Chrysler Retirees, UAW CHRYSLER SALARY WORKERS, 2007,
http://www.uaw.org/contracts/07/chrysler/sal/chry-salO5.php
[hereinafter
VEBA on Behalf of Chrysler Retirees]. Under each contract, "responsibility for
retiree medical benefits will shift to the new VEBA" beginning in January
2010. Id. It appears that the UAW plans to run a single VEBA that will have
separate accounting for contributions from each of the Big Three automakers
and possibly separate terms applicable to each automaker's retirees. PHYLLIS
C. BORZI, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., RETIREE HEALTH VEBAS: A NEW
TWIST ON AN OLD PARADIGM: IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREES 5 (2009).

"A single

administrative structure has been created with a single VEBA Board of
Trustees, but each of the retiree auto company groups will have its own
separate plan and separate subaccount within the VEBA trust." Id.
217. Gettelfinger & Ropson, supra note 216.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. VEBA on Behalf of Ford Retirees, supra note 216.
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UAW Ford workers. 222 The agreement also maintained certain
limits from the 2005 settlement on increases in retiree costsharing obligations at least through 2011 (when the 2005
agreement expires), with a commitment to attempt to maintain
those limits another four years but noted that the "VEBA trustees
may need to make benefit adjustments to maintain long-term
223
solvency."
Under the Chrysler agreement, the company promised to
contribute $8.8 billion to the VEBA in a combination of cash and
securities. 224 Specifically, the agreement called for Chrysler to
contribute approximately $7.1 billion in cash beginning in January
2008, with up to twenty additional annual payments of $50 million
each intended to serve as "backstop" payments similar to those
promised under the GM agreement-i.e., at "any time the VEBA's
funding level is projected to be insufficient to provide current
benefit levels for at least 25 years from the date of the required
payment."225

Funding for the Chrysler VEBA also included two

specialized debt instruments tied to Chrysler and foregone wage
The
increases from current UAW workers at Chrysler. 226
agreement restricted retiree cost increases to limited percentages
each year, but reserved to the VEBA's trustees the power to "make
227
benefit adjustments to maintain long-term solvency."
The bargaining agreements provided that the Big Three/UAW
VEBA would be managed by a committee of trustees, independent
from the automakers, who would eventually determine what
benefits the VEBA funds and on what terms. 228 Other than the
funding obligations specified in the 2007 collective bargaining
no further
would assume
agreements, the automakers
responsibility for retiree health benefits for union-represented
workers. 229 Assuming approval from the Securities and Exchange
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
VEBA on Behalf of Chrysler Retirees, supra note 216.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mark Bruno, United Autoworkers Revving Up the Big Three's VEBA,

PENSION

&

INVESTMENTS,

May

5,

2008,

available

at

http://www.pionline.com/article/20080505/REG/90366115 (reporting that the
VEBA's governing committee will be chaired by Robert Naftaly, a former Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan executive, with additional committee members
to include: Olena Berg-Lacey, a former assistant secretary of labor; Marianne
Udow-Phillips, director of Ann Arbor-based Center for Healthcare Quality and
Transformation, Ann Arbor, Mich.; Teresa Ghilarducci, a retirement policy
expert at the New School for Social Research in New York City; David Baker
Lewis, founder of Detroit-based law firm Lewis & Munday; and Ed Welch,
director of the Workers' Compensation Center at Michigan State University's
School of Labor and Industrial Relations in East Lansing, Michigan).
229. See, e.g., VEBA on Behalf of Chrysler Retirees, supra note 216
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Commission, each of the Big Three would remove the FAS 106
liability for UAW retirees from their books, giving their balance
sheets a much-needed boost.230 In August 2007, the federal court
reviewing the 2005 settlement agreements between the UAW and
Ford and GM noted that GM provided health benefits, between
active and retired workers and their spouses and dependents, to
approximately 1.1 million individuals at a cost of $5.4 billion in
2005 alone, the majority of which was dedicated to retiree health
costs. 2 3 1 Ford in 2005 provided health insurance to 590,000
individuals at a cost of $3.5 billion, again with the majority going
232
to retiree health benefits.
With the establishment of the UAW-run VEBA, the Big Three
would offload a total of about $88.7 billion in healthcare liabilities
from their balance sheets 233 at a cost projected to be about $56.5
billion in contributions from the three companies, significantly less
than the liabilities carried on their financial statements. 234 Under
the 2007 agreements, the new VEBA would be responsible for
retiree health benefits for an estimated 540,000 retirees, spouses
and dependents, taking into account all three companies' union
235
retiree health obligations.

(explaining that, beginning January 1, 2010, assuming final court approval by
that date, "responsibility for retiree medical benefits will shift to the new
VEBA."). See also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. MOTOR VEHICLE
INDUSTRY: FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND RESTRUCTURING 29 (Jan. 30,

2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40003.pdf.
230. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 229, at 18-19; O'Brien,

supra note 126, at 6.
231. UAW v. GMC, 497 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2007).
232. Id.
233. GM was estimated to save $46.7 billion in retiree health care expenses
currently on its balance sheet, Ford about $23.7 billion, and Chrysler about
$18.3 billion. O'Brien, supra note 126, at 6.
234. Id. GM was estimated to be funding the VEBA at about 68% of its total
liability, Ford at about 60%, and Chrysler at about 57%. Id. Beyond the
disclosed and quantifiable balance sheet liability, employers also shoulder the
burden with any employer-sponsored health plan of compliance with the Code,
ERISA, and other applicable laws, plus the day-to-day administrative
expenses that accompany running a health insurance program. Even though
most employers with VEBAs-like the Big Three--probably also maintain
ongoing health insurance programs for active employees and incur the related
administrative costs and obligations without regard to the VEBAs, removing
large numbers of individuals from the rolls of participants saves employers
money. If nothing else, it requires fewer personnel hours to service smaller
numbers of participants.
235. Id. at 8, 12. The 2008-2009 auto industry bailouts, bankruptcies, and
restructuring led to reopening negotiations between Chrysler, GM, and the
UAW. See, e.g., David Shepardson, UAW Balks at Proposals to Change
Funding for Retiree Health Care, THE DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 15, 2009, at
Business 1 (reporting the UAW's disagreement with GM and Chrysler's
proposal to further reduce cash contributions to the VEBA). The resulting
agreements retained the VEBA's independent structure and defeasance
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C. Key Featuresof Defeasance/Stand-Alone VEBAs
The automakers/UAW style of VEBA is sometimes called a
"defeasance" VEBA because it in effect voids an employer's prior
commitment to provide retiree health benefits. 23 6
Unlike
traditional VEBAs, the employer bows out of the picture with a
defeasance VEBA and puts the VEBA itself at center stage. Other
than meeting its agreed-upon funding commitment, the employer
is not involved. 237 The VEBA itself assumes the core functions of a
health plan-establishing coverage levels and making ongoing
administrative decisions-through its operating board. 238 Far
from being a mere funding mechanism largely invisible to plan
participants, the VEBA becomes the key operating entity.239 With
the defeasance VEBA, employers may assist in establishing the
VEBA and may even assist partially in funding it, but they do not
control its operation. 240 Because of the VEBA's truly independent
nature, this model is also sometimes referred to as a "stand-alone"
VEBA.241
The new style of VEBA has also been characterized as a
"defined contribution" VEBA as opposed to a "defined benefit"
VEBA. 242 In a defined contribution plan, an employer fixes its
characteristics but altered the funding structure considerably for the two
companies then near bankruptcy. Instead of the original cash infusions
promised by GM to the VEBA, the revised version provides for the VEBA to be
funded by various GM securities and for the VEBA to own 17.5% of the
restructured, post-bankruptcy GM. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treas., FACT
SHEET: Obama Administration Auto RestructuringInitiative: GeneralMotors
Restructuring (May 31, 2009), available at https:lHtreas.gov/press/releases/tg
179.htm. The Chrysler VEBA owns 55% of the equity in the post-bankruptcy
company. Micheline Maynard, Union Takes Rare Front Seat in Deal for
Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2009, at Al.
236. Bernstein, supra note 125, at 7. Mr. Bernstein notes that management
side labor lawyers dislike the term "defeasance VEBAs" because "many
companies have asserted that retiree health isn't a legal obligation at all." Id.
at 7-8. The debate over termination of retiree health benefits is beyond the
scope of this Article. For discussions of the various issues involved, see Lynn
A. Karoly & Jeannette Rogowski, Retiree Health Benefits and Retirement
Behavior: Implications for Health Policy, HEALTH BENEFITS AND THE
WORKFORCE, 1998, at 43-71, availableat http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprintsl
RP836l; John G. Marcis, The Uncertain Promise of Retiree Health Benefits, S.
ECON. J., July 1993, at 16; Lauren A. McCormack et al., Trends in Retiree
Health Benefits, 21 HEALTH AFF. 169, 171-72 (2002),; Posting of Michael D.
Miller to Health Policy and Communications
Blog, http: /Iwww.
healthpolcom.comlblog/2009/01/08/auto-industry-retirees-health-benefits-sque
ezed-againl (Jan. 8, 2009, 13:11 EST).
237. See Bruno, supra note 228 (noting the independent nature of the
VEBA's management).
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. BORZI, supra note 216, at 10.
241. Bernstein, supra note 125, at 7.
242. Id.
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contribution, and employees receive from that contribution only
243
whatever benefits the fixed sum eventually generates.
Employees thus depend on the investment success of the amount
contributed and cannot rely on an employer promise to provide
any particular benefit. 244 By contrast, in a defined benefit plan,
the employer specifies the end benefit and then bears the risk of
saving and investing assets appropriately to meet the obligation
when it comes due. 245 Just as defined benefit pension plans have
given way over the past three decades to defined contribution
retirement plans, most notably 401(k) plans, so too has a trend
toward defined contribution health plans begun to take hold in
246
employment-based health insurance, albeit much more slowly.
The type of VEBA exemplified by the automakers/UAW model
allows employers to fix their total contribution for retiree
healthcare at the outset and largely to avoid responsibility for
whether that contribution in fact suffices to provide health
benefits in the long run.247 The standard VEBA of the employersponsored health insurance era functions more as a defined benefit
model because the employer separately promises a certain level of
benefits and uses the VEBA to assist in funding the benefits, but
248
in the end remains responsible for any additional assets needed.
By contrast, retirees in the defeasance VEBA shoulder the burden
of expenses that outstrip whatever fixed financial commitment
249
their employers made.
The appeal of the defeasance VEBAs to private sector
employers lies predominantly in their ability to transfer assets
that total some amount less than the retiree health liability
carried on the employers' balance sheets under FAS 106.250 In the

243. Id.
244. Id.

245. William Gail & Benjamin Harris, The Tax Policy Briefing Book: A
Citizens' Guide for the 2008 Election, and Beyond, TAX POLY CENTER, Dec. 4,
2007, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/keyelements/savings-retire
ment/defined-benefit.com.
246. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Is Health Insurance a Bad Idea? The
Consumer-Driven Perspective, 14 CONN. INS. L. J. 377, 383 (2008) (asserting
that consumer-driven health care had experienced a rapid growth in the first
years but "seems to have leveled off").
247. BORZI, supra note 216, at 7, 9.
248. See Bernstein, supra note 125, at 4 (noting VEBAs can function "like a
traditional defined-benefit pension plan and payf a fixed dollar amount to
cover qualified benefits.").
249. It is precisely this problem that resulted in a lawsuit with the
Caterpillar VEBA when it ran out of funds. Popely, supra note 195, at

Business C1.
250. See O'Brien, supra note 126, at 3 (observing that VEBAs offer
companies "the opportunity to take future projected liabilities off their balance
sheets and, assuming they fund them at a discount, improve their standing in
credit markets").
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2007 automakers/UAW VEBA, for example, the Big Three
committed to fund their VEBAs at a rate equal to approximately
64% of the liability on their books. 251 Similarly, other defeasance
VEBAs have been funded at rates below the employers' total
balance sheet liability for retiree health.252 These agreements
effectively bump a company's accounting net worth upward once
the VEBA takes over.
For union retirees, the stand-alone VEBA model provides
some modicum of security in what has become a highly insecure
health benefit universe.2 53
Although such retirees enjoy
protections under collective bargaining agreements, 254 those
benefit guarantees could prove worthless if the companies on the

251. Id. at 6.
252. See, e.g., supra notes 189-190 and accompanying text (regarding
Navistar's lowering of its $2.6 billion in hourly retiree health costs to $1 billion
contributed to a VEBA); notes 196-198 and accompanying text (regarding
Goodyear's lowering of its $1.2 billion retiree health liability to $1 billion
contributed to a VEBA); notes 206-207 and accompanying text (regarding AK
Steel's lowering of its $1 billion retiree health liability to $663 million
contributed to a VEBA). Although one criticism of the new VEBA is that no
external oversight mechanism exists to guide or monitor the determinations
made in the bargaining process, the unions involved so far in negotiating the
new VEBAs have had access to expert advice in making their determinations.
For example, the UAW relied on Lazard Freres and Milliman, both wellknown national consulting firms, for assistance in the 2007 negotiations.
VEBA on Behalf of Chrysler Retirees, supra note 216. Moreover, both a federal
district judge and sometimes an appellate court rule on the fairness of a
settlement's terms in the typical defeasance VEBA. Id. Of course, whether
funding amounts suffice in the long run depends on assumptions about
unknown and largely uncontrollable features such as the future cost of
healthcare. The UAW acknowledged after the 2007 negotiations that its
"bargaining team had to make an assumption about future cost savings." Id.
253. Many UAW retirees do not hold this view.
Dissidents have
characterized the new VEBA as 'Vandalize Employee Benefits Again," and
numerous anti-VEBA commentaries proliferate on the internet. See, e.g.,
UAW's Gettelfinger Adds: "No Interest in Retaining Auto Stock" to World's "3
Biggest
Lies,"
CAR
CZAR
CONSULTING,
May
5,
2009,
http://carczarconsulting.com/05/05/uaws-gettelfinger-adds-to-3-biggest-lies-nointerest-in-retaining-auto-stock/; Posting of Richard to Union Review,
http://unionreview.com/printable/node/413
(Aug. 21, 2007); Posting of
Chickwithapen to Factory Rats Unite! Blog, http://www.charmwrite.com/fa
ctoryrat/modules.php?name=Forums&file=viewtopic&t=1420&start=O&postda
ys=O&postorder=asc&highlight= (Aug. 15, 2007, 18:42 EST); Posting of Gregg
Shotwell to Soldiers of Solidarity, http://www.soldiersofsolidarity.com/LB_A_9
6.pdf (undated).
254. Outside the collective bargaining context, an employer that no longer
wishes to fund retiree health benefits can simply terminate the retiree health
plan and be rid of the responsibility-and the related FAS 106 liabilities.
Without the contractual obligations imposed through collective bargaining, an
employer generally is not required to maintain any type of welfare benefit.
See O'Brien, supra note 126, at 2 (noting that without a contract, employers
can change retiree benefits at any time).
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other side of the bargaining tables fail.
Retirees face the
possibility of losing everything if their former employers implode.
To the extent assets are transferred to independent VEBAs,255
however, retirees have a chance of receiving at least some degree
of the promised benefits. 256 As a result, the VEBA risk may be well
worth taking for retirees in faltering industries. In a UAW
communication to Ford employees announcing the 2007 VEBA
agreement, the union observed that,
while we believe that Ford is both legally and morally
obligated to pay retiree medical benefits, the company's
obligation is largely unfunded. Continued benefits depend on
Ford's financial health. If Ford, which lost $12.6 billion last
year, were to file for bankruptcy, retiree medical benefits
257
could be cut or eliminated entirely.
The union continued with the observation that "the risk of a
future VEBA shortfall is clearly preferable to the risk of relying on
Ford to continue providing retiree benefits indefinitely."258 Such
better-than-nothing reasoning lies at the heart of retirees'
acceptance of defeasance VEBAs and hits at the value of the
arrangements as a type of stopgap in the absence of a long-term
solution. 259
255. The deductibility limits under Code Sections 419/419A and the UBIT
rules mean that only collectively bargained VEBAs can pre-fund retiree health
benefits through a VEBA without negative tax consequences. See supra notes
181-185 and accompanying text. Although the Code could be restored to its
pre-1984 form to allow pre-funding of non-union retiree health benefits, an
employer without a long-term contractual commitment would still be unlikely
to shift significant funds into any employee welfare benefit trust, much less a
completely independent one like the new model VEBA. Steven J. Sacher,
Issueman Tackles the New VEBAs, 35 BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 820
(2008). Companies tend to prefer to maintain as much liquidity as possible,
particularly in difficult economic times. Id.
256. Proponents of the new VEBA have advanced some arguments that may
be overly optimistic. For example, the UAW has suggested that the new Big
Three/UAW VEBA will be able to negotiate better prices and control costs as a
result of its massive size, yet GM for years has provided health benefits to
even more individuals than will the combined automakers/UAW VEBA. See
O'Brien, supra note 126, at 12 (noting that the UAW may use its size negotiate
lower prices, but it must be able to do this better than the automakers to make
a difference).
257. A Message to UAW Ford Retirees, UAW FORD REPORT (UAW, Detroit,
MI), Nov. 2007, at 14, availableat http://www.uaw892.org/ford-hourly-report2007.pdf.
258. Id. at 15.
259. Professor Kathryn Moore concludes in an analysis of the "new" VEBA
model:
Although the new retiree health VEBAs have received a considerable
amount of press in recent months, they are not a panacea for this
country's health care financing woes.
The new VEBAs are an
appropriate vehicle for pre-funding retiree health benefits for some
employers, particularly financially distressed employers with significant
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CONSIDERING THE DEFEASANCE

VEBA IN THE

PUBLIC SECTOR

State and local governments today find themselves in a
situation strikingly similar to the position of many large private
sector companies in the early 1990s. In both cases, employers
made promises over long periods of time to provide future
benefits, 260 either ignoring the accumulating liability or perhaps
assuming perpetual pay-as-you-go funding. In both cases, thenapplicable accounting rules enabled employers to avoid
recognizing the true cost of their retiree health promises. 26 1
Eventually, first for private sector employers with FAS 106, more
than a decade later for public sector employers with GASB 45,
changes to the accounting rules triggered financial revelation
when employers finally faced the implications of their former
commitments. 262 Confronted with massive retiree health benefit
liabilities, most public sector employers, like their private sector
counterparts, simply do not have surplus assets to offset the
accounting hits to their financial bottom line. 263

In the recent

economic downturn, the economic challenge has become even more
acute. 264
Like the private sector companies that eventually embraced
the defeasance VEBA model, 265 governmental employers cannot
easily change their benefit packages. Not only are public sector
employers heavily unionized like many traditional manufacturers,
but they are also constrained in some cases by statutory and
constitutional requirements. 266 Efforts to modify retiree health
benefits have encountered fierce opposition. For example, both
Michigan and Utah were sued when they changed provisions
relating to various state employee retiree health benefits. 267 Both

retiree health care liabilities and large union workforces.
Kathryn L. Moore, The New Retiree Health VEBAs, NYU REV. EMP. BENEFITS
& EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, 2008, at § 7.06.
260. See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying text (regarding the expansion
of private sector retiree health benefits); notes 54-63 and accompanying text
(regarding the expansion of public sector retiree health benefits).
261. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (highlighting the
financial challenges facing public sector employees with unfunded retiree
health liabilities).
264. See ACADEMYHEALTH, supra note 60, at 9-10 (stating that, in December
2008, states were reporting an estimated $43 billion shortfall).
265. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text discussing the types of
private sector employers that have adopted defeasance VEBAs) and Section

IV.B.
266. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.

267. Studier v. Mich. Public Sch. Employees Ret. Bd., 698 N.W.2d 350, 354
(Mich. 2005); Utah Public Employees Ass'n v. State of Utah, 131 P.3d 208,
209-10 (Utah 2006). See also BERMAN & KEATING, supra note 150, at 23.
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states eventually won in court, 268 and legal restraints may indeed
be less than sometimes perceived. 269 On the other hand, few
employers willingly invite litigation, especially where there is
uncertainty, 270 and there remain strong traditions of maintaining
generous retiree health benefits that may make actual termination
271
of benefits untenable for many public sector employers.
Public sector employers also resemble collectively bargained
private sector companies in their ability to take advantage of
certain pre-funding options under the Code that are not otherwise
available to private sector employers. 272 Both types of employers
can pre-fund retiree health benefits through VEBAs without
adverse tax consequences.27 3 In the private sector, collectively
bargained employers are specifically exempt from the deduction
and UBIT limits that otherwise restrain widespread VEBA
expansion. 274 Government employers--inherently or expresslyare similarly exempt.2 7 5
Government employers even enjoy
276
additional tax-advantaged alternatives such as 115 trusts.
Even the motivations driving employer retiree health benefit
choices are
similar between the collectively bargained
manufacturers of the past two decades and today's public sector
employers. With FAS 106 as well as GASB 45, the concern for
employers has not been increased obligations. In both cases, the
accounting rules require only disclosure of previous commitments,
268. Studier, 698 N.W.2d at 354; Utah Public Employees Ass'n, 131 P.3d at
209-10.
269. See, e.g., Phil Fairbanks, Public Retiree Health Insurance Cost Is a
Fiscal Time Bomb, BUFFALO NEWS, July 1, 2009, at 2, available at http:
H/www.buffalonews.com/cityregion[buffaloerie/story/565471.html
(quoting a
New York State official to the effect that "changes [proposed by the New York
governor] can be enacted unilaterally by state lawmakers because the benefits
are part of Civil Service Law, not union contracts."); Robert L. Clark, Will
Public Sector Retiree Health Benefit Plans Survive? Economic and Policy
Implications of Unfunded Liabilities, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 2, 533 (2009)
(explaining that while the majority of states' constitutions include provisions
for governing retirement plans, "retiree health plans are not accorded similar
protected status. Reductions in, or the elimination of, retiree health benefits
may be constrained by collective bargaining contracts, but in general
legislatures have been more flexible to reduce and modify retiree health
benefit plans for public sector employees.").
270. The situation of private sector employers in the early years of benefit
modification and termination efforts resembles the current position of many
public employers. It was not yet clear in the late 1980s and early 1990s the
degree to which private sector employers are generally free to terminate
retiree welfare benefits. CLARK ET AL., ECONOMICS OF AN AGING SOCIETY,
supra note 41, at 115.
271. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
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not new commitments. 277 But that disclosure has financial impact
sufficient to drive decision-making. Thus, private employers since
the early 1990s have twisted and turned to reduce or eliminate
retiree health liability, a goal met with the adoption of defeasance
VEBAs.278 Although government employers might seem as though
they would focus less on balance sheet considerations, the
ramifications of GASB 45 for their creditworthiness should drive
279
them to seek solutions that improve their balance sheets.
For retirees also, the situations resemble each other. In both
cases, anticipated health benefits may not be as secure as
expected. In the private sector, the risk has been acute and at
times overwhelming with faltering manufacturers. 28 0 In the public
sector, of course, retirees need not worry that their prior
employers will actually cease to exist, but that does not mean the
benefits are safe. While modifying or terminating public sector
benefits may be difficult, 28 1 even statutory protections can change
if public opinion shifts. As noted in a 2007 U.S. Government
Accountability Office report, "provisions that lend stability for
public sector pensions and retiree health benefits are subject to
change... "282 Long-term benefit commitments fundamentally
depend on public will, a notoriously fickle matter. 28 3 Recent news
articles and policy briefs suggest that public employees are, in fact,
compensated better than private employees. 28 4
Continuing
revelations to that effect could undercut the traditional

277. See supra notes 89, 96-97 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 111-129 and accompanying text.
279. Fitch Ratings Weighs in, supra note 108, at 2 (noting that Fitch Ratings
"will focus on understanding each issuer's liability and its plan for addressing
the liability, as well as the soundness of the rationale behind the plan"). In
addition, a Fitch report stated that "prudent accumulation of assets in a trust
account outside the general fund and well in advance of pay-as-you-go cost
escalations can avoid or forestall liquidity problems or tax capacity concerns
that might lead to credit deterioration." Id.
280. See supra notes 253-259 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
282. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE & LOCAL GOV'T RETIREE
BENEFITS: CURRENT STATUS OF BENEFIT STRUCTURES, PROTECTIONS, AND
FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR FUNDING FUTURE COSTS, REPORT No. GAO-07-1156 39

(2007) (noting that retiree health benefits are easier to change than pensions
and, in fact, often can be changed "simply through the annual budget
process.").
283. See Young, supra note 108 (noting that "[e]ven if increasing OPEB costs
are 'affordable,' they may not be politically palatable . . . private sector
workers, as voters, who do not have as high a level of health care coverage as
their local government employee neighbors, may resist any increases in
government taxes or fees to cover higher OPEB contributions.").
284. See, e.g., Dennis Cauchon, Public, PrivatePay Gap Grows, USA TODAY,
Apr. 10, 2009, at 1A ('The pay gap between government workers and lowercompensated private employees is growing as public employees enjoy sizable
benefit growth even in a distressed economy .... ).
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justification for maintaining public employee benefits. 2 5 Relying
on public employers, especially in difficult economic times, to
provide expensive benefits that are not widely available to the
taxpaying public may be almost as risky as depending on
struggling private industries.
In light of these comparisons, the defeasance VEBA model
bears consideration in the public sector. Public employers need to
manage two core problems: the accounting/balance sheet impact of
GASB 45 disclosure and the actual mounting cost of retiree health
benefits. Although the two problems are inextricably related, the
solutions are different. Thus, to avoid any negative impact from
GASB 45 disclosure, public employers need only fund the benefits
in some way.
Particularly because of their tax-exempt and
governmental status, public employers enjoy a number of effective
alternatives for setting aside funds for this purpose. 28 6 In the
short term, just taking steps toward funding in a thoughtful,
proactive manner may suffice to mollify the credit reporting
agencies, whose opinion is vital for future borrowing needs of the
governmental entities. 28 7
Even partial funding eases the
288
accounting impact of disclosure.
With regard to the accounting considerations and funding
benefits, a defeasance VEBA does not necessarily improve the
position of a government employer any more than a regular VEBA
or another kind of trust. Public employers would be unlikely to
win the kind of funding arrangements that have made the
defeasance VEBA a boon to struggling manufacturers in the
private sector. When private sector companies fund these VEBAs
at a lower rate than their booked liability, they actually reduce
their obligations. 28 9 Employees and retirees of these companies

285. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
287. See Fleet, supra note 101, at 1 (quoting California State controller John
Chiang on GASB 45, stating, "As long as we come up with a methodical,
responsible plan to pay for these future obligations, we will satisfy the bond
and credit rating agencies .... "); see also Walters, supra note 147 (quoting
Parry Young, head of public finance for Standard & Poor's rating agency, as
saying, "What we're looking for is a thoughtful plan on how they're going to
manage this liability."); MICHAEL A. MORAN, GOLDMAN, SACHS & Co, THE
TRILLION DOLLAR QUESTION: WHAT IS YOUR GASB 45 NUMBER? 12 (2007)

(concluding, with regard to the credit rating agencies, "that maintaining the
status quo is not an option and taking proactive approaches to address the

issue will be viewed positively by the rating agencies.").
288. Fleet, supra note 101 (stating that "[e]ven if the prepayments are less
than the full amount, whatever is put aside can begin earning investment
returns that will reduce liability.").
289. See supra notes 189-190 and accompanying text (Navistar); notes 196198 and accompanying text (Goodyear); notes 206-207 and accompanying text
(AK Steel); notes 233-234 and accompanying text (regarding the Big Three's

lowering of their combined $88.7 billion retiree health liability to $56.6 billion
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know that they are likely better off to accept something, however
undesirable and less valuable than the original commitment,
rather than gamble on the future of a financially unstable
company. 290
Public sector employees confront far less risk.
Without the same fear, public sector employees would have little
reason to agree to any arrangement that resulted in lower funding
of retiree health benefits.
A defeasance VEBA could offer value to public sector
employers, however, by transforming the retiree benefit obligation
into a defined contribution obligation 291 instead of the open-ended
commitment that has prevailed in the past. Even if employers
agree to fund fully the current value of accumulated benefits, plus
some ongoing level of benefits, a fixed cost caps the long-term risk
to the governmental entities. In addition, although funding for
defeasance VEBAs tends to be front-loaded, even the automakers'
VEBAs initially included multi-year "backstop" payment
provisions that assume future contributions as needed over a
number of years. 292 For public employers, for whom an upfront
infusion of significant amounts of cash could present a nearly
insurmountable obstacle, long-term funding could be established
according to a prescribed formula.
From the retirees' perspective, whether a defeasance VEBA
model would appeal might depend on the perceived risk that
benefits will eventually be reduced or eliminated. The more funds
can be set aside in an irrevocable and protected trust like a VEBA,
the better protection such retirees will enjoy. Of course, shifting to
a defined contribution model and putting assets into a protected
trust does not require a defeasance VEBA. Any form of VEBA-or
other irrevocable
trusts earmarked
for retiree
health
benefits-would provide similar protection for assets, and a
defined contribution model could be created within the health plan
to which a traditional VEBA is linked for funding. However, the
defeasance VEBA could offer additional advantages to retirees.
The defeasance VEBA model removes employers completely from
the benefit planning and decision-making process, moving those
crucial functions to independent trustees whose duties run only to
covered retirees. 293 In the public sector, where public opinion may
drive future benefit choices, removing benefit decisions from the
political sphere could have merit and appeal.
Public sector
retirees might find themselves far more comfortable with the
to be contributed to the VEBA).
290. See supra notes 253-259 and accompanying text.
291. See Fitch Ratings Weighs in, supra note 108, at 2.

(reporting on the

impact of GASB 45 and stating that it expected "many governments to switch
to defined contribution systems for OPEBS-at least for new hires.").
292. See supra Section IV.B.
293. See supra Section IV.B.
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decisions of an independent board. In addition, the independent
trustees tend to be the same kinds of experts who manage
employer plans, which protects against too much decision-making
risk being dumped onto retiree shoulders. 294 Thus, the defeasance
VEBA structure could provide retirees with many of the same
administrative advantages that employer plans offer.
CONCLUSION

In light of the similarities between public and private sector
retiree health benefits, the defeasance VEBA model would seem at
least to deserve consideration by government employers. But so
far, while VEBAs and other trust options appear in funding
discussions, the stand-alone VEBA alternative appears absent.
Perhaps it seems too far removed from where the public sector
perceives itself to be on this issue. At the heart of the defeasance
VEBA approach lies the abdication of employer responsibility for
retiree health benefits. That might trigger an automatic negative
reaction from the public sector, with its long history of rich
benefits.
Perhaps that reaction would be appropriate. Certainly, public
sector retirees and their advocates would not embrace happily any
option with an odor of rejection of long-term commitments by
employers, whether legally enforceable or not. On the other hand,
retiree health benefits are clearly endangered in the private
sector, and they may be slipping that way in the public sector. If
the trend towards a defined contribution approach for these
obligations continues, the real question should be how best to
leverage the employer contribution for retirees. Retirees might
want to consider whom they trust-former employers or
independent trustees.
Admittedly, perhaps hopefully, if the
economy stabilizes and national health reform takes place, the
stand-alone VEBA may be unnecessary and unattractive in the
public sector. The urgency that has driven such VEBAs in the
private sector does not exist to the same degree with government
plans. While government plans need to take some action, the path
can be well-considered. In the end, retirees and government
employers must weigh their risks and choose accordingly. They
should do so, however, with all their options on the table.

294. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.

